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INTRODUCTION
Across a constitutional divide, Congress and the
federal courts share a mutual obligation to ensure that
our judicial system offers all Americans justice in civil
and criminal matters within a reasonable time and at
reasonable expense. Neither branch alone can
accomplish this important goal. The federal judiciary
cannot adequately solve systemic problems affecting
congestion, delay, and costs in the courts without
appropriate legislative reform instituted by
Congress. Congress, for its part, cannot legislate
efficiency in the federal court system without granting
federal judges the autonomy, resources, and direction
to employ their unique expertise in devising effective
procedural reforms.1
–Joseph Biden
Such were then-Senator Joseph Biden's words describing the need
to empower federal judges in 1994 after the passage of the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).2

*

Jeffrey Scott Wolfe serves as a United States Administrative Law Judge with
the Social Security Administration Office of Disability Adjudication and Review,
previously serving as United States Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court, Northern
District Oklahoma. He is a graduate of the University of California, San Diego
(A.B., 1973), California Western School of Law (J.D., 1976), and the University of
San Diego School of Law (LL.M., cum laude, 1991). He teaches as an adjunct
professor of law at the University of Tulsa College of Law, where he currently
teaches Social Security Disability Law and Arbitration Law. He also serves as one
of two coaches for the University of Tulsa College of Law National Health Law
competition team. He is a member of the California and Oklahoma Bar
Associations.
The views, ideas, and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the Author
and not the United States Government, the Social Security Administration, or any
component thereof. This Article does not reflect the views, policies, or opinions of
the United States Government, the Social Security Administration, or any
component thereof.
1

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our Mutual Obligation, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (1994).
2
28 U.S.C. §§471-482 (2006).
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The CJRA became the cornerstone of federal judicial reform,
designed to combat growing costs and delay in the federal courts-circumstances that held potential for increasingly reduced access to
the courts by the American public.3 These words and the actions they
describe are equally true today when considering the Social Security
Administration's (SSA's) system of administrative appeals, described
as the largest administrative adjudicatory system on the planet.4
Some 700,000 administrative appeals are now pending before
SSA in a system designed to handle only 400,000. This “backlog” of
some 300,000 appeals is not a single-year phenomenon, but has been
growing for decades. The salient truths emerging from this backlog
are not interesting tidbits for statisticians but stories of human
suffering as American citizens wait--in some cases, for more than
two years--for their “day in court” after being denied disability
benefits.
The hard truth behind this story is that it could have been
avoided. In a report released in December 2007, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) stated:
[M]anagement weaknesses as evidenced by a
number of initiatives that were not successfully
implemented have limited SSA's ability to remedy the

3

See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Extending the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 64 U.
CIN. L. REV. 105 (1995). The author notes:
The Act commanded that by December 31, 1995 the Judicial
Conference submit a report on the pilot program, including an
analysis of how much the principles and guidelines decreased
expense and delay, to the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives. The legislation required that the
Conference consider these results in light of the effect on cost
and delay....
Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
4
See Information About Social Security's Hearings and Appeals Process, Soc.
Sec. Online, http://www.ssa.gov/appeals (last modified Jan. 20, 2012) (“The Social
Security Administration's (SSA) administrative appeals operation, under the Office
of Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR) is one of the largest administrative
judicial systems in the world. SSA issues more than half a million hearing and
appeal dispositions each year. Administrative law judges (ALJ) conduct hearings
and issue decisions.”).
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backlog. Several initiatives introduced by SSA in the
last 10 years to improve processing times and
eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the
problem. For example, the “Hearings Process
Improvement” initiative implemented in fiscal year
2000 significantly increased the days it took to
adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it.5
Most recently, the agency has sought and attained appointment of
an increased number of administrative law judges (ALJs)—judges
appointed under the aegis of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)6—to hear and decide cases in an increased number of hearing
offices around the country. As SSA Commissioner Michael J. Astrue
has commented, “increasing the number of administrative law judges
has resulted in a plateau in the rise of pending cases.”7 While
laudable, the issue framed by the backlog centers not simply on the
number of judges but on the way in which they work--especially
within the bureaucratic milieu of an executive branch agency such as
SSA.
The world's largest administrative judicial system houses some
1,300 federal administrative law judges within the Office of
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR). These judges are not,
5

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-40, Social Security Disability:
Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation Could Help Address Backlogs 3-4
(2007)
[hereinafter
GAO-08-40,
Better
Planning],
http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf.
6
See 5 U.S.C. §3105 (2006), which provides:
Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges
as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in
accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this
title. Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in
rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform duties
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as
administrative law judges.
7

News Release, Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security Hearings Backlog Falls to
Lowest
Level
Since
2005
(Mar.
2,
2010),
http://
www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/hearings-backlog-0310-pr-alt.pdf.
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however, “independent” as are members of the federal judiciary.
Instead, embedded within an executive branch agency, the federal
administrative judiciary within ODAR is described as “quasiindependent,” functioning this way as a result of the APA, which
provides for independent decisionmaking and quasi-independence in
tenure and service.
Given the foregoing, the premise underlying this Article and each
of its several sections is straightforward: the task of judging embraces
discrete skills that cannot be fully maximized absent a jurisprudential
environment in which such skills may be fully exercised. Members
of the administrative judiciary, appointed under the APA, exercise a
judicial function tempered not by original jurisdiction under the law
as in the courts, but, as with all executive branch agencies, by
congressional delegation of legislative power and derivative
regulation implemented by the agency. It is within this cultural
milieu that the issue of effective adjudicatory functioning arises; and
it is here that many argue the adjudicatory process has faltered. It is
here where it must be rejuvenated.
Part I of this Article explores the actions of the agency over time,
both as related directly to the role of the administrative law judge in
the case management process and to the agency's management of the
backlog crisis generally, examining the cultural environment of
bureaucratic management that has, despite the passage of decades,
failed to remedy a persistent animus between the agency and its cadre
of administrative law judges to the public detriment. Part II next
examines the core attributes of the managerial judge and contrasts
this in Part III with the agency's handling of the backlog of disability
appeals specifically. Part IV examines the alternative of an
independent corps of administrative law judges as a viable means to
implement needed case management oversight and Part V
summarizes the issues. Appendix I highlights selected GAO reports
focused on the agency's handling of the backlog; Appendix II lists
pertinent GAO reports selected over a twenty-year period from 1989
to 2009.
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I. THE CHALLENGE: THE BACKLOG, THE JUDGES, AND THE AGENCY
A. The Backlog, the Judges, and the Agency
As of this writing, some 700,000 appeals8 are pending before
ODAR—most being appeals of the agency's denial of disability
claims.9 This represents almost twice the number of appeals that the
agency acknowledges its hearings and appeals system is designed to
handle in a timely and effective manner.10 The resultant delay in
hearing and decisionmaking has given rise to numerous reports of
human suffering and tragically poignant stories of desperation as
Americans seeking much- needed benefits are told to wait.11

8

See Eliminating the Social Security Disability Backlog: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. and Subcomm. on Income Sec. & Family Support of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 134 (2009) (statement of Hon.
Ronald G. Bernoski, President, Association of Administrative Law Judges),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg50764/pdf/CHRG111hhrg50764.pdf (“Towering over SSA is a backlog of over 765,000 cases
claiming disability benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security
Act.”).
9
See infra note 23 (discussing the administrative hearings and appeals process,
in which the Social Security Act provides for a tiered decisionmaking/adjudicative
process in disability appeals).
10
SSA defines a backlog as a set of cases pending beyond an optimal projected
number at the end of a given fiscal year. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) describes SSA's definition of a backlogged case as follows:
SSA measures its claims processing performance at each
level of the process in terms of the number of claims pending
each year and the time it takes to issue a decision. Since 1999,
the agency has used a relative measure to determine the backlog
by considering how many cases should optimally be pending at
year-end. This relative measure is referred to as “target pending”
and is set for each level of the disability process with the
exception of the reconsideration level. SSA's target pending is
400,000 for claims at the initial stage and 300,000 and 40,000 for
the hearings and Appeals Council stages, respectively. The
number of pending claims at year-end that exceed these numbers
represents the backlog.
GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5, at 10.
11
See, e.g., Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education,
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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Whether the framers of the Social Security Act envisioned the future
scope and breadth of that which they originally conceived cannot
truly be known. Today, SSA oversees the world's largest system of
administrative adjudication with some 1,300 administrative law
judges sited in 169 hearing offices throughout the United States.12 At
issue are appeals from determinations by the agency under Title II
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act,13 primarily related to
determinations of entitlement to disability benefits.
The original intent of the framers of the Social Security Act in
their description of administrative decisionmaking—including
adjudication—is made clear in a 1940 statement by the Social
Security Board in which the Board described the anticipated
decisionmaking model under the new Social Security Act “in terms
of ‘simplicity and informality’ as well as ‘accuracy and fairness.”’14
In the words of Paul Verkuil, “The decision model proposed by the
Social Security Board was designed to make an enormously complex
program work at low cost and with substantial public satisfaction.”15
The goal identified is transparency in decisionmaking with sustained
public approval in meeting the need for clear and timely
administrative responses. Unfortunately, the lofty goals of the 1940s-to meet the needs of a nation poised on the brink of a new age--now
lie buried, overwhelmed by numbers once not thought possible.
An overview of the decisionmaking and appeals process through
which an individual must progress is initially important to understand
the context of the Social Security hearings and appeals
process. Under the Social Security Act, agency decisions with which
a person disagrees proceed through a multistep decision and appeals
the Dep'ts of Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies of the H.
Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 695, 764-66 (2008), available at
http://www.c-c-d.org/task_forces/social_sec/CCD-House-Approps-testimony2-2808.pdf (Marty Ford, Co-Chair, Social Security Task Force Consortium for Citizens
with Disabilities, testifying on reducing the backlog at SSA and on SSA's FY 2009
budget overview).
12
See Hearings and Appeals, Hearing Office Locator, Soc. Sec. Online,
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/ho_locator.html (last visited May 14, 2012).
13
See 42 U.S.C. §901 (2006) (establishing the current independent executive
branch agency we know as the Social Security Administration).
14
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978).
15
Id.
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process. The Act establishes an individual right to a hearing in the
event of disagreement with an agency decision.16 Four internal levels
comprise the hearings and appeals process. A person aggrieved by an
“initial determination” of the agency may seek “reconsideration.”17
If after reconsideration a grievance yet remains, the individual may
file a request for hearing before a federal administrative law judge.18
The first two steps in this process are generally paper determinations
with no personal inquiry or appearance by the claimant. When a
request for hearing is made, the individual claimant is given the
opportunity to appear before an administrative law judge, who,
appointed under the APA,19 serves as an independent decisionmaker
charged with making “findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights
of any individual applying for a payment” under the Act.20 Upon
conducting a hearing, the administrative law judge, acting under a
delegation of authority from the Commissioner, “shall, on the basis
of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse the
Commissioner's findings of fact and such decision.”21
If the claimant disagrees with the decision of the administrative
law judge he or she may file a “request for review” before the
Appeals Council—once again, a paper review of the administrative
law judge's hearing and findings.22 Upon review, the Appeals
Council may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the
administrative law judge.23 By statute, the aggrieved claimant who
16

42 U.S.C. §405(b).
Id. §405(b)(3)(A).
18
Id. §405(g).
19
5 U.S.C. §3105 (2006).
20
42 U.S.C. §405(b)(1).
21
Id.
22
See 20 C.F.R. §404.968 (2011).
23
See Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, Provision of 42 USCS §405(g) Making
Secretary of Health and Human Services' Findings of Fact Conclusive If Supported
By Substantial Evidence as Applying to Administrative Law Judge or Social
Security Appeals Council, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 280, 287, §2(a) (1988) (“[A]n individual
seeking benefits from the Social Security Administration will, in the first instance,
receive an initial determination by the agency either granting or denying benefits. If
the individual is dissatisfied with the initial determination, he or she may request a
reconsideration. The next step in the administrative appeal process is for the
individual to file a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
Once the ALJ has rendered a decision, the Social Security Appeals Council may
17
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still disagrees with the decision of the agency may then seek judicial
review.24
At stake now is a crisis of pending appeals before administrative
law judges—a backlog that has grown despite the agency's longstanding knowledge of the problem.25 Repeated unsuccessful
attempts by the agency to resolve this crisis have not stilled the cries
of the waiting nor salved the pain of those who suffer.26 The hope of
a helping hand has been lost in a system overburdened with
bureaucratic initiative, underscored by a growing disenfranchisement
of its judges. What was once intended to meet the needs of those who
can no longer compete in the workplace has itself become a burden.

review the decision either on a motion of the individual, or on the motion of the
Council itself pursuant to 20 CFR §404.969.” (footnote omitted)).
24
42 U.S.C. §405(g).
25
See GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5.
Over the last decade, SSA experienced a substantial increase
in its backlog of disability claims, with a particularly severe
accumulation of claims at the hearing level. From fiscal years
1997 through 2006, the total number of backlogged claims-numbers exceeding the level that should optimally be pending or
in the pipeline at year-end--doubled.... In fiscal year 2006, 30
percent of claims processed at the hearings stage alone, took 600
days or more.
Id. at 3.
26
See, for example, the GAO commentary, which in a summary statement
effectively describes SSA's repeated unsuccessful attempts to resolve the backlog:
Finally, management weaknesses as evidenced by a number
of initiatives that were not successfully implemented have limited
SSA's ability to remedy the backlog. Several initiatives
introduced by SSA in the last 10 years to improve processing
times and eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the
problem. For example, the “Hearings Process Improvement”
initiative implemented in fiscal year 2000 significantly increased
the days it took to adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated
the backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it.
Id. at 3-4.
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B. The Judges
Federal administrative law judges have been described as akin to
federal district judges in the Judicial Branch.27 Administrative law
judges serving in the Executive Branch derive their authority both
from the APA and, by operation of such statute, derivatively from the
agency head.28 As such they serve as neutral decisionmakers,
charged with ensuring that appeals from agency action be handled in
a fair, impartial, and timely manner. This has been described as the
power to hear and decide. Significant debate, however, exists over
the jurisprudential reach of an administrative law judge's mandate to
hear and decide within ODAR.29
At the outset, when considering this question in light of the
overall role of judges within SSA, there is little question but that the
agency's cadre of administrative law judges plays a vital role in
resolving administrative appeals pending before the agency.
In no small measure, however, can the agency's inability to avoid
the current crisis—though it has been growing now for many years—
be said to be a direct result of the agency's, and derivatively,
Congress's, unwillingness to empower its cadre of administrative law
judges as was done in the federal courts when the Judicial Branch
faced a similar crisis of rising costs and delay.
Unlike the reformation of the federal courts in the 1990s with the
enactment of the CJRA,30 proposals for reform within ODAR,
including calls for a Social Security Court similar to that of the Court

27

See infra note 52.
5 U.S.C. §556 (2006) provides in part:
(b) There shall preside at the taking of evidence -(1) the agency;
(2) one or more members of the body which comprises the
agency; or
(3) one or more administrative law judges appointed under
section 3105 of this title.
29
See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 32 Tulsa L.J. 203, 212 (1996).
30
28 U.S.C. §§471-482 (2006). As the U.S. Senate explained, the purpose of
the Civil Justice Reform Act was “to promote for all citizens--rich or poor,
individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant--the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's Federal courts.” S. Rep. No. 101-416, at
1 (1990).
28

Spring 2013

Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications

147

of Appeals for Veterans Claims, have been rejected. Also rejected
was legislation designed to remove administrative law judges from
the agencies in which they now function, establishing a separate
adjudicative agency; arguably, some say, a necessary step to enable
administrative law judges to return to the task of judging unhindered
by unnecessary agency intervention and political agendas. 31 These

31

See, e.g., John Holmes, In Praise of the ALJ System, Admin. & Reg. L.
News, Summer 1996, at 3, 17. Holmes writes:
A “Corps Bill” to house all ALJs under one roof has again
been proposed in Congress but not acted on during the last
session. Proponents allege that such a corps would assure
independence from agency pressure, provide more efficient
handling of caseloads since ALJs could be assigned on a gradual
basis to those areas where more work has been generated, and
would provide savings and efficiency through elimination of
duplication of material and personnel. Opponents contend there
would be a loss of expertise, alleged savings would be
ephemeral, and that the proposed bill would shift political
pressure to Congress. Some feel Social Security interests would
eventually dominate such a “corps.”
...
A well trained, experienced cadre of ALJs exists which is
well recognized and respected by practitioners for its judicial
integrity, independence, and competence. Not all decisions
rendered by federal agencies need be subject to ALJ jurisdiction.
Indeed, most decisions do not require hearing. Others are
amenable to non-judicial determination such as mediation or
other alternative dispute resolution. However, when substantive
rights of private parties are affected adversely by agency actions
and/or controversy arises between private parties because of
agency actions, a competent form of independent, impartial, final
decisionmaking is required. In my opinion, Congress should
mandate and agencies should use more, rather than less,
ALJs. The best manner of obtaining a settlement of a dispute is
where all parties are aware that they will obtain a fair, impartial
hearing and a relatively prompt, analyzed decision on the merits.
I also note earlier referenced attempts at passage of a socalled administrative law judge Corps Bill, as set forth in the
1983 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary. Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearing Before
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issues are especially visible within SSA, which utilizes a greater
number of administrative law judges than all other federal agencies
combined.32 Despite calls for judicial empowerment, administrative
law judges within the agency have found their jurisprudential reach
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983). The purpose of that
hearing was styled, “A Bill to Establish a Specialized Corps of
Judges Necessary for Certain Federal Proceedings Required to be
Conducted, and For Other Purposes.” Id. In a statement before
the Subcommittee, Professor Abraham Dash of the University of
Maryland School of Law, in endorsing the bill, stated in part:
I am very much for this bill, but I come here with some
bewilderment. Bewilderment that the Federal Government in
1983 is still discussing this issue. I know that the files of the
committee must have the past record of this issue, but I would
like to remind you of that history. Back in 1936, more than 20
years before the APA became law, we had the Norris and the
Logan bill, which talked of an administrative court by
consolidating our present article I courts with the hearing
examiners. This concept failed. Then you have the second
Hoover commission of 1955, which recommended a centralized
administrative hearing system. I might note that the present bill,
under consideration has some of the same principles in it as the
Logan bill and Hoover commission report.
The Hoover commission, as I said, in 1955 recommended
much the same thing. The Ash Council, in 1971, after another
thorough study, talked in terms of an administrative court of
appeals, and addressed this issue.
In 1974, the Civil Service Commission report, I think it was
known as the LaMacchia Committee, came out for a uniform
corps of administrative law judges, after extensive study.
In 1977, the Bork Committee of the Department of Justice
came out for the same thing. In other words, I think the record is
so replete with these recommendations after extensive studies,
that it's amazing we haven't done anything about it at this time.
Id. at 98; see also Rhonda McMillion, Autonomy for ALJs: Bills Would Create
Independent Corps of Administrative Law Judges, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 103
(“The problems that have beset the system, causing judges to sue their employing
agencies, and employing agencies to pressure and threaten judges, are not caused
by any one agency; they are the result of the conflict caused by housing judges in
the very agency whose decisions they review” (quoting Judge Charles Bono, thenPresident of the Association of Administrative Law Judges).
32
See Schwartz, supra note 29, at 213 (showing a table of the distribution of
administrative law judges across all federal agencies).
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going in the other direction.
Instead of empowering judges, the agency has gradually
narrowed the judges' case management window, with the latest such
action being implementation of regulations potentially curtailing the
judge's ability to set the time and place of the hearing. While not
applicable to all judges in all circumstances, the regulation focuses
on judges who are not functioning as it is perceived they should.33
This action is unfortunately consistent with a long-standing animus
between the agency and its cadre of judges, extending back to the late
1970s when, in 1977, the Association of Administrative Law Judges
filed an action before the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri in response to agency-imposed quotas.34 While
that action was settled with the promise of no future quotas, it did not
prevent the agency from pursuing four separate actions against
administrative law judges for low productivity in the 1980s.35
Suffice it to say, the agency and its judges must find common
professional ground. Failure to do so has led to an ineffective longterm resolution of case management issues, which in turn has led to
the current backlog. The critical inquiry when examining the history
of today's pending administrative caseload is why the agency has not
followed the example of the federal courts in the face of a growing
backlog. Why has the agency not empowered its judges? A
longitudinal view of the issues surrounding pending appeals before
the earlier Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA), the former Office
of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and now ODAR, leads an observer
to conclude that the agency response to a growing caseload has been
to pursue bureaucratic solutions and establish top-down control
33

See 20 C.F.R. §404.936(a) (2011), (providing that the agency, as opposed to
the administrative law judge, “may” establish the time and place of the hearing:
“We may set the time and place for any hearing. We may change the time and
place, if it is necessary.”).
34
Settlement Agreement, Bono v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W4 (W.D. Mo. 1979), reprinted in Social Security Disability Reviews: The Role of
the Administrative Law Judge: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
Gov't Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong. 448 (1983).
The Settlement Agreement signed by the parties provides, in part: “[The Office of
Hearings and Appeals] will not issue directives or memoranda setting any specific
number of dispositions by ALJs as quotas or goals.” Id.
35
For a discussion of the action undertaken under the Bellmon Amendment,
see infra note 46.
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mechanisms with hoped-for control of both outcomes and activity.
The result of such actions—whether intended or not--has been a
narrowing of judges' responsibility for case management. For
example, as of this writing, despite years of a growing backlog and
an increasing number of lawyers and nonlawyers representing
claimants in such appeals, no overarching formal rules of procedure
govern hearings before Social Security administrative law judges
despite calls from the administrative judiciary to implement such
rules.36 Instead, the agency has, over the span of several decades,
invoked all manner of administrative “initiatives,” “process
improvements,” and disability “re-engineering” efforts, few of which
have involved the administrative judiciary, and few of which, as
discussed herein, have actually accomplished the intended results.37
Despite these efforts, the disability appeals backlog has grown to the
point that many now suffer as a result of significant delay and
unavailability of timely access to de novo appeal procedures before
an administrative law judge following an administrative denial.38
What was intended to be a transparent appeals process with attendant
widespread public satisfaction has instead become an opaque, littleunderstood adjudicatory mechanism whose outworkings have been
characterized by at least one national disability law firm as
antagonistic and intimidating.39
36

This is not to say that there are no regulations that govern such hearings. To
the contrary, a regulatory structure exists, but effectively fails to accomplish longidentified gaps, such as closing the evidentiary record following close of the
hearing. See, e.g., Administrative Law Judge Hearing Procedures--General, 20
C.F.R. §404.944 (2011).
37
See GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5, at 3-4.
38
A bevy of news reports abound. See, e.g., Disability Claims Spike, Mire
Backlogged
System,
CBS
News
(May
18,
2010),
http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/11/national/main6471596.shtml.
39
The Binder & Binder Newsletter recites, “WE'LL DEAL WITH THE
GOVERNMENT, YOU HAVE ENOUGH TO WORRY ABOUT.” Binder &
Binder
Monthly
Newsletter,
Binder
&
Binder,
http://newsletter.binderandbinder.com/ (last visited May 14, 2012). The Binder &
Binder Commercial Break further states, “Reminding you that we are, ‘America's
Most Successful Social Security Disability Advocates' gives you a little sometimes
necessary encouragement when you see our commercials....For the same reason,
you like being reminded that we, ‘don't let anybody intimidate you.”’ Dick
Summer,
Commercial
Break,
Binder
&
Binder,
http://005623d.netsolhost.com/prints/binder-and-binder-commercial-break.pdf (last
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The single most significant signpost pointing toward this growing
opacity in the disability appeals process--with a resultant inability to
resolve the backlog--is the long history of conflict between the
agency and its administrative law judges. This broken relationship
has even drawn the notice of and comment from the blue-ribbon,
presidentially-appointed Social Security Advisory Board. As recently
as 2006, the Board urged both the agency and its judges to, in effect,
bury the hatchet.40 That a presidential blue-ribbon advisory panel felt
compelled to make such a comment is telling. Such notice is not,
however, a new phenomenon.
In 1978, the Social Security Administration departed from the

visited May 14, 2012).
40
A 2006 report of the Social Security Advisory Board calls for reconciliation
between the agency and its administrative law judges:
In our 2001 report on the disability process, we noted a need
to change SSA's relationship with its ALJs from one of
confrontation to cooperation. There is still a need to improve that
relationship. There is a residue of mistrust that goes back at least
as far as the late 1970s, when pressures to reduce the number of
allowances and increase the number of decisions led to a
situation that was described as “an agency at war with itself.”
Since then, many ALJs have resented what they saw as the
agency's failure to consult them about changes that have been
made. Lack of consultation on the Hearing Process Improvement
initiative implemented in 2000 was a major factor lending
support to the formation of the ALJ union. We believe that the
SSA-ALJ relationship has improved more recently but still needs
attention.
The agency has much to gain from the advice and input of
the dedicated professionals in the ALJ corps, at the national,
regional, and hearing office levels. The ALJ corps, in turn, needs
to acknowledge the agency's legitimate desire to ensure that
hearing decisions are made promptly and consistently. There is
an understandable and probably inevitable tension between the
public's interest in decisional independence and the public's
interest in consistency and efficiency, but we believe these
interests can be reconciled. We urge SSA and its ALJs to work
together to develop reasonable procedures to reconcile them.
Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Improving the Social Security Administration's Hearing
Process
15
(2006)
(footnote
omitted),
http://
ssab.gov/documents/HearingProcess.pdf.
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plan laid down by its former Director of the Bureau of Hearings and
Appeals, H. Dale Cook, who was appointed to the federal bench in
1974. In 1975, Robert Trachtenberg assumed office and plotted a
new course. During Director Cook's tenure, the agency expressed
strong arguments in favor of APA applicability before the Civil
Service Commission, specifically advancing the need for
administrative law judges. Under Director Trachtenberg, however,
new initiatives were put into place, which drove the agency into a
twenty-five-year period of tension with its judges. Even the staff of
the House Ways and Means Committee commented on the long
history of conflict between administrative law judges and SSA
management in the years since Director Trachtenberg's tenure:
[T]he staff is concerned by the apparent state of
BHA administration at the present time. Lawsuits
have been filed by BHA employees concerning
administration and a multitude of administrative
charges have been instituted by both sides. It is an
agency at war with itself. The management and rather
substantial numbers of staff are devoting a great deal
of their time attacking each other. This time could be
better spent serving social security claimants.41
The source of this ongoing animus arguably lies in a fundamental
difference in worldview. In effect, Director Trachtenberg changed
the agency's culture by adopting a bureaucratic worldview and
subsuming the judicial perspective. The result has been both
dramatic and, over time, detrimental to the agency's mission as first
conceived.42 In considering the effect of this fundamental change,
one must necessarily consider the function of those whom we call
“bureaucrats.” Bureaucrats attempt to manage and control
performance and outcomes to achieve politically designated goals.
This concept is inherently anathema to the American ideal of a “fair”
41

Jeffrey Scott Wolfe, Are You Willing To Make The Commitment In
Writing? The APA, ALJs, and SSA, 55 Okla. L. Rev. 203, 237-38 n.268 (2002)
(alteration in original) (quoting Staff of Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., Social Security Administrative Law Judges:
Survey and Issue Paper 3 (Comm. Print 1979)).
42
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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hearing that affords an individual fundamental due process rights
before an independent decisionmaker who is to render an impartial
decision and who is not bound by a predetermined political agenda in
which value is placed on consistency and predictability.43
Bureaucrats are less flexible in their actions with a
correspondingly reduced ability to adapt to a changing environment
with creativity and innovation.44 They are perceived as the mirror
image of the American ideal of a fair-minded judge who acts not on a
political agenda but who seeks the “right” result regardless of
political cost. No citation of authority is needed to state that
Americans seek a fair shot at overturning a prior unfavorable result.
Fair play and due process are fundamental ideals of American
culture. Americans are desirous of a fair opportunity to convince a
43

See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Bureaucrats or Politicians?
Part I: A Single Policy Task, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 169 (2007). Alesina and Tabellini
note:
A recent principal-agent literature addresses related issues in
career-concerns models. Mathias Dewatripont, Ian Jewitt, and
Jean Tirole [ ] discuss the foundations of this approach and apply
it to study the behavior of government agencies. They focus on
some issues related to ours, namely the nature and “fuzziness” of
the agencies' mission, but they do not contrast bureaucratic and
political accountability. Eric Maskin and Tirole [ ] investigate the
attribution of responsibilities between accountable and
nonaccountable agents. The latter have intrinsic motivations,
while the former seek to please their principals because of
implicit rewards (career concerns). In our set up, instead, we
neglect the role of intrinsic motivations. Both bureaucrats and
politicians need to be kept accountable with implicit incentives,
but the implicit incentive schemes can be of two kinds: those that
define a politician (striving for reelection), and those that define a
bureaucrat (career concerns). Christian Schultz [ ] contrasts direct
democracy, representative democracy, and bureaucratic
delegation. Like Maskin and Tirole...he views bureaucrats as
unaccountable and focuses on the trade-off between ideological
polarization and accountability: bureaucrats are less polarized
than partisan politicians, but are more inflexible since they are
unaccountable and cannot be removed after shocks to the voters'
policy preferences.
Id. at 170 (emphasis added).
44
Id.
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neutral decisionmaker of the efficacy of their cause. In such a setting
there is no external control or management over the outcome--only
the doing of that which Americans cherish--the furthering of the
ideals of justice and fair play.45 The growing tide of such appeals has
strained a bureaucratically managed judicial system, a fact evident
from the existence of the backlog itself. That the agency has
attempted to bureaucratically manage a judicial system while
withholding necessary tools from its judges, with singularly poor
results, is evident from its actions dating back to the 1980s. In a
strange scenario played out in reverse, the agency brought a
challenge to its judges' decisionmaking when it implemented the socalled Bellmon review.46 Judges whose “favorable” decision rate,

45

Nowhere is this more significant than in Social Security appeals
proceedings. Unlike regulatory agencies, individual decisions by administrative law
judges in Social Security cases do not determine agency policy. See Daniel J.
Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative
Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (1991), in which the author notes
the inherent difference between regulatory agencies which establish essential
agency policy through individual precedential adjudications and mass-justice
benefits agencies, such as SSA, where individual adjudications are not
policymaking or precedential.
For agencies with extremely large caseloads, typically no
individual
disposition
decisions
are
salient
in
themselves. Important issues of policy are resolved in generic
rulemaking proceedings which produce standards governing
behavior or the disposition of future cases. This type of caseload,
accordingly, tends to be centered on the resolution of factual
disputes rather than policy issues. For this type of caseload,
adjudication of cases by a separate or quasi-separate
administrative organ is the best response. Indeed, in the case of
large-scale benefit or other programs, the volume of adjudication
may be so large as to render ineffective attempts to control policy
through the administrative appellate review process.
Id. at 998-99.
In the mass-justice agency, rulemaking is the primary policymaking
vehicle. Unfortunately, SSA's reluctance to implement comprehensive Rules of
Procedure place it in a role more akin to that of a regulatory agency, reserving the
right of agency review of individual decisions as if same were precedential; which,
of course, they are not, given the sheer number of cases decided.
46
See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Results of
Required Reviews of Administrative Law Judge Decisions (1989) [hereinafter
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that is, whose reversal of underlying administrative denials reached
70%, were targeted for disciplinary action, including “re-education”
by the agency. In a series of legal actions challenging the agency's
actions, individual administrative law judges argued the agency
action violated the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Nash v. Bowen,47 described the agency action toward its
administrative law judges as nothing short of coercion:
The point is that the “Bellmon Review Program”
is for all intents and purposes the same as the “Quality
Assurance System” considered herein, i.e., the
targeting and pressuring of ALJs with high allowance
of benefit rates (a/k/a “reversal” rates) to fall into line
or be subjected to disciplinary action.
....
The Secretary's “reversal” rate policy embodied in
the “Quality Assurance System,” however, is cause
for concern. To coerce ALJs into lowering reversal
rates--that is, into deciding more cases against
claimants--would, if shown, constitute in the district
GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews]. The Report notes:
Social Security disability claimants whose initial benefit
applications are denied may appeal through several layers of
administrative and judicial processes. However, the appeal
process is very time-consuming. For some claimants, even
favorable decisions by administrative law judges (ALJs) are
delayed because they are chosen at random for further review by
the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) Appeals Council. In
many cases the delay is only a month or so, but some cases are
delayed several months while subsequent appeals are considered.
This random review process is carried out under the Bellmon
Amendment (96-265, sec. 304(g)) passed in 1980. Early reviews
under the amendment were directed at ALJs who issued
favorable decisions in 70 percent or more of their cases and were
so controversial they led to a lawsuit by the Association of
ALJs. The controversy and lawsuit resulted in restrictions on the
use of Bellmon review data that limited the program's value for
quality assurance purposes.
Id. at 1.
47
869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
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court's words “a clear infringement of decisional
independence.”48
Rather than focus upon the issues that have traditionally
concerned judicial case management--rising costs and increasing
delays--the agency, in implementing the Bellmon review, seemed
animated by the political question of whether too many were being
granted benefits. The “bureaucratic” concern thus evidenced was
improperly placed on the outcome of the case by questioning the
substantive performance of the judges rather than modifying the
underlying criteria for award of Social Security benefits, with little
attendant concern for the growing backlog. This example portrays the
agency's misplaced emphasis, especially in a system where individual
adjudicative decisions do not affect overall Social Security policy. It
is a revealing window into the agency's cultural environment.
To set due process as an overarching goal requires a cogent, welldefined infrastructure, free of political interference. It becomes an
even more complex undertaking if burdened by politically driven
outcomes. As a matter of practical jurisprudence, due process in
American juridical systems occurs within a human system whose
defining characteristics embody concepts of justice and fair play
tempered by compassion. Considering both the black letter of the
law and the otherwise real context of disparate human life, the
American ideal of justice necessarily asks, What is the right thing to
do? This is a decision often sheltered in gradations of gray. This is
especially so in the fact-intensive undertaking made by federal
administrative law judges in Social Security disability
appeals. These essential American ideals run contrary to the demand
for control, political consistency, and predictability inherent in
modern notions of a politically-animated bureaucracy. Here lies the
impetus, if not the roadblock, to change in Social Security's disability
appeals system. What is required is a fundamental cultural change
within the agency's worldview, ending the “Trachtenberg Era,”
whose legacy dates to 1975, and beginning anew an era in which
politically independent judges, and not agency managers, administer
a judicial system.

48

Id. at 679, 681.
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C. The Agency
Viewed from a wider perspective, the agency's apparent historical
animus toward its administrative law judges and the corresponding
resistance by judges to the demanded predictability of bureaucratic
and politically motivated outcomes appears to rest squarely on
inherent tensions that arise in the placement of a judicial system
within an executive branch bureaucracy. These tensions are
exacerbated by the agency's seeming confusion of roles--treating
what are fact-intensive hearings as if such hearings were
policymaking--when, as a matter of Executive Branch functioning,
such hearings cannot by definition play such a role. The sheer
number of such hearings belies such a result.49
In advocating such a view, one necessarily embraces the
attendant corollary: the goals, worldview, and functioning of
bureaucracies fundamentally differ from those of judicial
systems. And while one might argue the system of adjudication
mandated by the APA50 necessarily places administrative law judges
inside the bounds of executive branch agencies, the sheer size of the
modern adjudicatory system of disability appeals exceeds that
envisioned in 1946 when the APA was passed--most certainly by
several orders of magnitude.51 The growth of this system of
administrative adjudication—populated not primarily by “managers”
but by legally trained professionals serving in a role likened to that of
the federal judiciary52—has fundamentally changed the system as

49

See 5 U.S.C. §3105 (2006).
5 U.S.C. §§554, 556 (2006).
51
For example, in Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme Court first noted that
“over 20,000 disability claim hearings [are held] annually.” 402 U.S. 389, 406
(1971). To the Court, this was a “structure of great and growing complexity”:
“Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion. It
assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and
working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity.” Id. at
410. Today, more than thirty times as many appeals are pending. One cannot but
wonder whether the Court would, today, declare that the disability appeals system
is “working well” as it did in 1971.
52
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (noting that an
administrative law judge performs a “functionally comparable” role to a judge and
that “the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that
the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before
50
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originally envisioned. Despite this evolutionary change, Social
Security “managers” continue to circumscribe the role of the
administrative judiciary, seeking greater control over its members as
the spiraling backlog continues.53 Administrative law judges,
foreclosed from many of the procedural tools they deem necessary to
accomplish the task before them, seek to improve their professional
functioning as judges. The result? A clash of worldviews, resulting in

him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency.”). A
number of lower court decisions have echoed the Butz ruling, reaffirming the
Court's declaration that “the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an
agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the
independent judgment of these men and women.” Id. at 514.
53
The situation brings to mind the counter-intuitive lessons in learning to fly,
and more particularly, learning to escape a spin. In the words of an Army pilot:
One of the maneuvers that I was taught was how to put the
plane into a spin and bring it back to level flight. It was fairly
easy to start the spin, we just slowed the plane down and pulled
the nose up so that it was not hardly flying and it would begin the
spin.
Now came the hard part, getting it back to straight and level
flight. This plane was pointed almost straight down at the ground
and spinning. The natural inclination was to take the stick and, if
the spin was to the right, pull the plane back to the left. But, if
we did this, it would begin spinning to the left and in a tighter
spin.
The way to get this plane out of the spin and back flying the
way it was supposed to fly was to take your feet off of the pedals
and let go of the stick. If you did this, it would just fly its self
right out of the spin and back to normal flight. If you would fight
with the plane, it would continue to spin until it crashed into the
ground.
Learning to do that was one of the hardest things that I had
to learn in all of flight school. Learning to let go and let it
happen.
See Stay In the Now, I've Got You, Happyness Is a Choice.com, http://
happynessisachoice.com/articles/acceptance/stay. The lesson illustrates human
nature generally, and describes agency behavior as regards the administrative
judiciary, specifically. A natural, virtually instinctive response when faced with
crisis is to seize control and attempt to do something. It is counter-intuitive to let
go. Rather than let go and thereby avoid a crash, agency managers have grasped an
even tighter hold, effectively ignoring the solution of letting go (and unleashing the
talents of its administrative law judge corps).
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ongoing calls from the Social Security Advisory Board, the American
Bar Association, and the Association of Administrative Law Judges
to resolve these differences. Setting aside the arguments on each side,
it is at bottom an animus ill-suited to the task of public service so
significantly involving the welfare of the American people.
At this juncture in American history, the situation is
straightforward, if not difficult to embrace. The Nation's disability
appeals system has grown beyond its founding roots. The evolution
of the system of disability benefits began with a fundamental shift in
national perspective in 1935 with the passage of the Social Security
Act.54 In the midst of the Great Depression, Americans in a
competitive, capitalist society gained an assurance that their
contributions as American workers would not go unrewarded, such
that a small benefit was made available upon retirement, which today
has become a mainstay of millions of Americans in their elder years.
In the 1950s, Americans recognized that this same benefit should be
extended to those not yet of retirement age but who, because of
disabling physical or mental conditions, could no longer compete in
order to meet minimum daily needs for sustenance and shelter. This
benefit, too, has gained a significant place in American society.55
While retirement benefits are generally a function of numerical
analysis (quarters paid, amounts earned, etc.), the question of
entitlement to disability benefits is far more subjective--embracing
legal, vocational, and medical issues--and is often open to varying
interpretation. By operation of law, the subjective nature of these
determinations warrants an opportunity to be heard--to present
evidence and testimony in aid of the claim.
As discussed herein, arguably, the ability of the agency to meet
the demands of this due process requirement has been outstripped by
the need for greater and greater numbers of such hearings, resulting
in a hearings backlog of such duration and extent that it is now a

54

For an historical overview of the Social Security Act and history leading to
that point in time, see Historical Background and Development of Social Security,
Soc. Sec. Online. (Dec. 6, 2011), http:// www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html
(last modified Dec. 6, 2011).
55
See A History of the Social Security Disability Programs, Soc. Sec. Online.
(1986), http://www.ssa.gov/history/1986dibhistory.html (last visited May 14,
2012).
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“crisis.”56 As a result, it is important to recognize the systemic
inadequacy of the bureaucratic worldview: the demand by the agency
upon its judges for resolution of dramatically increased numbers of
pending disability appeals has not resulted in a wider empowerment
of administrative law judges by the agency but has instead seen the
agency invoke repeated nonjudicial attempts to remedy the situation
while simultaneously narrowing the role of the administrative law
judge. This is no more plainly illustrated than by the recent change in
regulation potentially limiting the ability of the administrative law
judge to set his or her own docket.57
II. JUDGING AND THE EFFECTIVE DISPOSITION OF CASES: THE
MANAGERIAL JUDGE, THE CJRA, AND THE FRCP
Judging and effective disposition of cases are invariably functions
of caseload management--a task historically associated with the
professional functioning of judges. In this, the lessons from the
federal courthouses are instructive in the current Social Security
backlog crisis.
In the late 1970s and '80s, increasing caseloads and resulting
delays in the United States courts brought this reality into focus: to be
effective, a judge was no longer simply required to hear the evidence
in an individual case, ensure justice was done, and make a decision
when the parties indicated the case was ripe for decision. Leaving
the pace of the litigation to the parties often resulted in unwelcome
delay as one party sought--for both tactical and strategic reasons--to

56

See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-02-322, Social Security
Disability: Disappointing Results from SSA's Efforts to Improve the Disability
Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention (2002) [hereinafter GAO-02-322,
Disappointing Results]. The GAO stated, in part:
This [Hearing Process Improvement] initiative was
implemented nationwide in 2000. The initiative has not
improved the timeliness of decisions on appeals; rather, it has
slowed processing in hearings offices from 318 days to 336 days.
As a result, the backlog of cases waiting to be processed has
increased substantially and is rapidly approaching crisis levels.
Id. at 3.
57
Compare 20 C.F.R. §404.936 (2010), with 20 C.F.R. §404.936 (2011).
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slow the litigation process to the detriment of his opponent. This
resulted in a growing perception that the judicial system was
unresponsive to societal needs. Calls were made for change from
within the system. The role of the effective judicial officer was seen
as changing to fulfill the equitable maxim, “Justice delayed is justice
denied.”58 Doing so meant learning to engage in proactive pretrial
case management in an effort to bring pending cases to a more swift
resolution. Then-Chief Judge Robert Peckham, of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, makes the point plainly:
Traditionally, judges have been depicted solely as
dispensers of justice, weighing opposing evidence and
legal arguments on their finely-calibrated scales to
mete out rewards and punishments. Until quite
recently the trial judge played virtually no role in a
case until counsel for at least one side certified that it
was ready for trial. But today's massive volume of
litigation and the skyrocketing costs of attorney's fees
and other litigation expenses have, by necessity, cast
the trial judge in a new role, that of pretrial manager.59
The judge as pretrial manager views his or her role in the light of
increasing caseloads with attendant increases in the cost of access to
courts and resultant delay once there. This worldview is both
specific to the needs of individual cases as well as societal
recognition that delays in individual cases result in system-wide
general delay. As one writer observes:
Advocates of managerial judging point to several
indications that action is needed. They cite the
growing caseload of the federal judiciary. They
express concern with the changing nature of civil
litigation: new causes of action have expanded the
judicial role and challenged the limits of judges to

58

The Yale Book of Quotations 312 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (quoting
William E. Gladstone, British Prime Minister (1868-1894)).
59
Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981).
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reform institutions and to remedy social ills. More
recently, the rising cost of civil litigation has come to
the fore as a major justification for managerial
judging.
For now, it is not important to debate whether any
of the purported justifications for managerial judging
are valid. What is more important is to recognize that
the advocates of managerial judging are making a
fundamental critique of the existing procedural
regime. The present structure of civil procedure, they
say, necessarily fails to achieve its self-proclaimed
goal of “the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination” of controversies if left to its own
devices.60
Faced with institutional erosion in the form of increasing costs
and delays, the courts recognized a critical need to broaden the
judicial role to encompass the entire life cycle of a case, from the
moment of its filing to its eventual disposition.61 No longer was the
judge to be a passive participant awaiting word from the lawyers that
the case was now ready for trial. This was evident in the passage of
the CJRA.
The CJRA was enacted “to promote for all citizens--rich or poor,
individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant--the just, speedy and
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's federal
courts,”62 in recognition of a growing concern by federal judges that
“a litigation explosion was taking place in the federal courts,

60

E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 306, 309-10 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
61
See Carl Tobias, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 89, 90 (1993) (“Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act
during 1990 because of mounting concern over abuse in civil litigation, particularly
in the discovery process; the growing costs of resolving civil lawsuits; and
decreasing federal court access in those cases. For a decade and a half, many
federal judges, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, had contended that the federal
judiciary was experiencing a litigation explosion and increasing discovery and
litigation abuse.” (footnote omitted)).
62
S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 1 (1990).
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resulting in increased discovery and litigation abuse.”63
The legislative history indicates that the central purpose of the
Civil Justice Reform Act is to accomplish the often stated but
frequently unachieved goal of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: to ensure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination” of civil disputes in federal courts. The legislative
history notes that “[h]igh costs, long delays and insufficient judicial
resources all too often leave this time-honored promise unfulfilled.
By improving the quality of the process of civil litigation, this
legislation will contribute to improvement of the quality of justice
that the civil justice system delivers.”64
Integral to the implementation of the CJRA are core concepts of
managerial judging such that district judges working with required
CJRA Advisory Committees within each of the ninety-four federal
districts were to devise individual cost and delay reduction plans, to
be implemented within the district through “adoption of the specific
methods of litigation management and cost and delay reduction.”65
These concepts of judicial management included:
• “early and ongoing judicial management of cases”
• “management of the discovery process”
• “authorizing judges to explore settlement in complex
cases and requiring parties to have attorneys with
settlement authority present at conferences”
• “‘systematic [and] differential treatment of civil
cases that tailors the level of individualized and case
specific management’ to factors including ‘case
complexity, the amount of time reasonably needed to
prepare the case for trial, and the judicial and other
resources required and available for the preparation
and disposition of the case.”’66
63

Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1521, 1524 (1993).
64
Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375, 390 (1992) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 1 (1990)).
65
Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and
Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 843-45 (1994).
66
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
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Review of the original report67 giving rise to the CJRA captures
the essence of the revolution in judicial activism that the Act sought
to encourage: CJRA plans “should also recognize that there has not
been adequate utilization of available and existing tools to respond to
this substantially changed civil litigation system, to control cost and
delays.”68 The legislation thus sought to:
(1) Build reform from the bottom up;
(2) Promulgate a national, statutory policy in support of judicial
case management;
(3) Impose greater controls on the discovery process;
(4) Establish differentiated case management systems;
(5) Improve motions practice and reduce undue delays
associated with decisions on motions; and
(6) Expand and enhance the use of alternative dispute
resolution.69
In so acting, Congress sought to encourage proactive judicial
involvement in all federal civil actions, adopting a national public
policy calling for creative judicial management of civil litigation at
an early stage in the proceedings to curb cost and delay. Congress
demanded that federal judges abandon a passive stance and no longer
leave to counsel the decision to signal when a case is ready for
trial. Instead, early hands-on judicial case management was to
extend to the case from the moment of its filing, involving the
assigned judge at the beginning of the litigation to ensure effective,
efficient, and timely case management, and ultimately a less costly
disposition without undue delay.
For the agency the question of effective judicial involvement by
federal administrative law judges in case management is a question
of an expanded judicial role. The nature of the backlog crisis is
46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1456-60 (1994) (footnote omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§473(a)(1) (2006)).
67
See Brookings Inst. Task Force on Civil Justice Reform, Justice For All:
Reducing Costs and Delay in Civil Litigation (1989); see also Robel, supra note
66, at 1450.
68
See Robel, supra note 66, at 1460.
69
Mullenix, supra note 64, at 391 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 15 (1990)).
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described by the same problems federal courts confronted and whose
resolution was and remains a logical response. Professor Judith
Resnik frames the issue in her 1982 seminal article, Managerial
Judges. Quoting both the Commentary of the Mishnah and the
Preface to the Manual for Complex Litigation, Professor Resnik
offers pithy guidance to the problem of case management, evincing a
philosophical notion of the proper judicial role:
Should you be called upon to function as a judge,
do not be like the legal advisors who offer to place
their juridical knowledge at the service of the
litigating parties. . . . [Y]ou must remain silent and
abstain from interference in the arguments . . . . Do
not by even so much as a gesture seek to influence
either prosecution or defense.
And:
There are no inherently protracted cases, only
cases which are unnecessarily protracted by inefficient
procedures and management.70
The traditional judicial role stands out against the emergent
judicial role of judge-as-pretrial-case-manager. Professor Resnik
observes that the modern judicial role encompasses a view of judicial
activity as extending from the filing of the case to its ultimate
disposition.71 She describes this then-new role as “shepherding the
case to completion.”72 Shepherding contemplates greater familiarity
with the case at a much earlier time in the life of the litigation. In
this, she asserts judicial management is the new form of “judicial
activism” but warns that such “judicial management may be teaching
judges to value their statistics, such as the number of case
dispositions, more than they value the quality of their decisions.”73

70

Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982)
(alterations in original).
71
Id. at 378.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 380.
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She nevertheless acknowledges that the world of judging has, indeed,
changed:
Today the unhyphenated “pretrial” is a stage unto
itself, no longer a prelude to trial but rather assumed
to be the way to end a case without trial. Today's rule
brims with details about what judges are supposed to
do, including establishing “early and continuing
control,” organizing discovery, “facilitating the
settlement of the case,” and referring parties in
appropriate instances to “special procedures” (such as
arbitration or mediation) “to assist in resolving the
dispute.” In the contemporary rule, we find the
managerial judge, the settlement judge, the
dealmaking judge, [and] the judge promoting
alternative dispute resolution.74
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended undeniably
reflect this proactive approach beginning with Rule 1, which
establishes a lens through which the balance of the Rules—and
correspondingly, the actions thereunder—are to be viewed: “[The
Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”75 Rule 16, as Professor Resnik notes, provides for
detailed management of every civil action, requiring, in part:
In any action, the court may order the attorneys
and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or
more pretrial conferences for such purposes as:
(1) expediting disposition of the action;
(2) establishing early and continuing control so
that the case will not be protracted because of
lack of management;

74

Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000) (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted).
75
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
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(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial through
more thorough preparation, and;
(5) facilitating settlement.76
Rule 16 further requires entry of a scheduling order “as soon as
practicable, but in any event within the earlier of 120 days after any
defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days after any
defendant has appeared.”77 Entry of a scheduling order is thus
mandatory. A pretrial conference may then address a variety of
matters, including “special procedures for managing potentially
difficult or protracted actions” and “facilitating in other ways the just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.”78 In the words of
one writer,
Rule 16 is explicitly intended to encourage the
active judicial management of the case development
process and of trial in most civil actions. Rule 16 calls
on judges to fix deadlines for completing the major
pretrial tasks and encourages judges to actively
participate in designing case-specific plans for
positioning litigation as efficiently as possible for
disposition by settlement, motion, or trial. Rule 16
authorizes and regulates use of a wide range of case
management tools and powers--principally through
pretrial conferences. It also authorizes a wide range of
sanctions for violations of pretrial orders.79
The managerial judge in the federal court is thus equipped with
the tools to engage in proactive case management from the outset of
litigation, able to reach into his or her quiver and bring forth a variety
of arrows in an attempt to resolve the case before trial; or if not, to
76

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2).
78
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2), (2)(L), (2)(P).
79
3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 16-1 (3d ed. 2011); see
also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules-And the Extent of Convergence With Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191,
196 (2007).
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resolve the case in a timely manner in the courtroom. Effective
judging is seen to embrace effective--that is, timely--and just case
disposition. Among the options available are various pretrial
settlement mechanisms including ENEs (early neutral evaluations),
mini-trials, summary jury trials, and settlement conferences. This is
further encouraged by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1998,80 which provides that every U.S. District Court “shall devise
and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program, by
local rule adopted under section 2071(a), to encourage and promote
the use of alternative dispute resolution in its district.”81
A principal player behind the codification of judicial management
as reflected in the CJRA was then-United States Senator Joseph
Biden, who as Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
commissioned the Brookings Institution in conjunction with the
Foundation for Change to form a “task force to ‘develop a set of
recommendations to alleviate the problems of excessive cost and
delay.”’82 The findings of the task force became the basis for the
CJRA.83
In 1994, then-Senator Biden wrote in the Stanford Law Review:
For many years, the federal courts were the
preferred forum for many litigants, but recently public
confidence in the federal courts' ability to provide the
“just, inexpensive, and speedy determination of every
action” has begun to erode. . . . Court congestion has
become pronounced, particularly for civil cases, as
crowded dockets and inefficient procedures combine
to make litigation expensive and delays lengthy. As a
result, economic concerns rather than the merits of a

80

28 U.S.C. §651 (2006).
Id. §651(b). Rule 23 also authorizes extensive judicial management
procedures in class actions by conferring broad authority to make appropriate
orders to determine the course of the proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent
undue repetition or complication in presenting evidence or argument, in addition to
conferring authority to make appropriate orders to deal with similar procedural
matters. Rowe, supra note 79, at 196-97.
82
Johnston, supra note 65, at 837 (quoting Brookings Inst. Task Force on Civil
Justice Reform, supra note 67, at vii).
83
Id.
81
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case too often govern the decision to file a civil suit.
In a society where access to justice is implicit in our
Bill of Rights, the closing of the courthouse doors to
ordinary citizens threatens not only the judicial
system's operation, but also the integrity of the
democratic system.84
Then-Senator Biden thus viewed as critical the need for active
and expanded judicial management of civil cases as a means to
reverse a growing delay of such magnitude as to effectively close the
courthouse doors to the majority of the American people--a virtual
collapse of the system of justice if unchecked. The CJRA was
necessary to “restore public confidence.”85 Of particular note was
the perceived need for congressional action. As with the current crisis
confronting SSA, Senator Biden wrote of the federal court system:
These consensus-building efforts would have been
futile without the legislature's involvement. Prior to
the CJRA's enactment, the federal judiciary's recent
history was replete with proposals to reform the civil
justice system from groups such as the American Bar
Association, the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, and the American Law Institute. Yet despite
the warning bells and the calls for change from both
inside and outside the judiciary, the rule changes
recommended to Congress by the Judicial Conference
remained largely ineffectual.86
The lessons from the federal courthouse apply equally to the
backlog crisis now facing the agency and ultimately, the American
people. Those who assess the proactive role of the modern federal
judge agree, “If judges did not intervene in the morass that is modern
litigation, this would clog dockets, increase litigation costs, and free
litigants to use litigation's expense and delay to gain unfair tactical
84

Biden, supra note 1, at 1285-86 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1286.
86
Id. at 1291 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (noting that the American
Bar Association, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and the American Law
Institute all had proposals to reform the civil justice system).
85
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Why is it different for the

Pretrial management of cases has become a
necessary device for dealing with our judicial system's
bursting calendars. It has proven to be an advantage
to litigants and not merely a necessary evil. The
scheduling function served by the early status
conference has proven to be a particularly effective
device for increasing the productivity of courts and
minimizing the cost of litigation. Moreover, in the
pursuit of efficiency we have discovered a way to
improve our trials by making them better organized
and, I believe, more comprehensible to the lay juror. .
. . Pretrial properly focuses the action on the search
for truth rather than on gamesmanship.88
The solution adopted by the courts to growing delay and
increasing costs (with a resultant lack of public access to and
confidence in the federal courts) was to expand the active role of the
judge in case management, beginning at the initial filing of the case
through to completion. These measures allow the judge to bring his
or her full decisionmaking power to bear in the whole of the case-from its inception to completion--enabling greater flexibility and
creativity in handling and disposing of cases throughout the
litigation. Case resolution is no longer limited simply to disposition
by trial, or by prolonged traditional methods employed by counsel,
who by definition could not effectively resolve delay caused by a
recalcitrant opponent absent court intervention.89
These same solutions can and should be applied to the backlog
crisis now threatening public confidence in and access to the Nation's
87

Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113
YALE L.J. 27, 42 (2003).
88
Peckham, supra note 59, at 804-05.
89
Delay for the sake of delay often benefits the defendant in an adversarial
proceeding, for delay maintains the status quo ante, enables the passage of time, the
fading of memory, and the disappearance of evidence and witnesses. See, e.g.,
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 918 (Cal. 1997).
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system of disability claims and appeals. Effective judging requires
effective case management. Administrative law judges, before whom
hundreds of thousands of Americans appear each year, should be
enabled to apply the full measure of their ability to decide through
the life of the case--from the time a request for hearing is filed to
entry of a final decision. Effective case management tools should be
formulated and rules enacted, enabling members of the
administrative judiciary within the agency to take an expanded and
proactive role in the life of all cases that they will ultimately decide.
The question is, why not empower administrative law judges with
effective case management tools from the outset of a case?
III. ADJUDICATORY INERTIA WITHIN THE AGENCY
To answer the question requires the asking of yet another
question. Why has the case management role of the administrative
judiciary within the agency narrowed rather than grown in response
to a growing backlog? What has prevented the agency from
expanding the role of judges in addressing pending hearings? The
answers to these questions require an understanding of the
adjudicatory inertia that pervades the agency's approach to problem
solving.90
The crisis now facing the agency finds its genesis in a long
history of attempts to redress a growing caseload through
management-driven initiatives and process improvements, which did
not result in any effective solution to the problem but did serve to
further isolate the agency's cadre of administrative law judges from
the problem-solving roundtable. The collective results of these
various management-driven solutions have served to cement the
agency into a pattern of adjudication little changed since the 1970s.
The true measure of the extent of this adjudicatory stasis is seen
in the agency's multiple remedial attempts, resulting not in a
reduction of the growing backlog but in an escalation of the problem
to crisis proportions. Review of these various process improvements
and initiatives shows that all are bureaucratic add-ons--programs
largely outside the adjudicatory framework, described in their best
90

When examining these issues it is also necessary to examine pertinent GAO
findings verbatim, and so excerpts from such reports are reproduced here in order
to better understand and communicate the context of the findings.
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light as parallel attempts to address the pending caseload with little or
no judicial involvement in either their inception or implementation.
Succinctly stated, the agency has not sought to change an
adjudicatory model that has subsisted in its present form for more
than fifty years. Given the failure of management-driven solutions,
the present backlog augurs for just such a change. When first
devised, the hearings process was conceived as nonadversarial,
adopting an inquisitorial jurisprudence akin to that found in judicial
systems in continental Europe. Professor Robert M. Viles undertook
a comprehensive study of the Social Security disability system in
1968.91 He describes the hearing procedure in the words of one
hearing examiner:
In 99% of the cases, people come in without any
representation. It is my job to represent those people
when they come in. It seems strange, but we use the
terminology that we ‘wear three hats.’ We put on the
first hat, and we represent the claimant, we present all
the testimony on his behalf, and drag it out of him by
questioning. We then represent the government, the
Social Security Administration, and search the law-that's the second hat. We search our minds, and we
search whatever other records are available, we search
the evidence, and we present the best case that the
government has. Then we turn around and put on the
third hat, and we decide which evidence is most
favorable, and in whose behalf.92
This model remains today despite the fact that the number of
pending appeals has grown nationally from 20,000 in 197193 to over

91

Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers ...
And Poor People Too (pts. 1 & 2), 39 MISS. L.J. 371 (1968), 40 MISS. L.J. 24
(1968).
92
40 MISS. L.J. at 40-41 (quoting Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D.
Wis. 1967)).
93
See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971) (“With over
20,000 disability claim hearings annually, the cost of providing live medical
testimony at those hearings, where need has not been demonstrated by a request for
a subpoena, over and above the cost of the examinations requested by hearing
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700,000 today, and the percentage of persons represented by counsel
has grown to almost 80%.94
Hearing examiners are now
administrative law judges, but as recently as 2000, the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the inquisitorial nature of the administrative
hearing undertaken by Social Security administrative law judges.95
The push by administrative law judges for expanded case
management authority has sparked a debate over the question of
judicial independence under the APA.96 The agency's view is
straightforward. An administrative law judge's role is strictly limited
to “decisional-independence,” restricting the judge to conducting the
hearing and thereby largely reserving to the agency prehearing case
management. Under this view, the agency reserves to itself the right
to frame a judge's functioning within the larger structure of the
agency: “[I]n spite of the ALJ's complete independence of decision,
he/she is a part of and is under the administrative direction and
control of his employing agency.”97
In a January 31, 1997, memorandum on SSA hearings titled
Legal Foundations of the Duty of Impartiality in the Hearing Process
and its Applicability to Administrative Law Judges, then-General
Counsel Arthur Fried wrote:

examiners, would be a substantial drain on the trust fund and on the energy of
physicians already in short supply.”).
94
A September 2007 report by SSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) shows
that in fiscal year 2006, 439,000 of the 559,000 claims heard by administrative law
judges were represented by attorney and nonattorney representatives, representing
claimants in almost 80% of all claims appealed. Examined another way, the OIG
notes, “[i]n FY 2006, approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 non-attorneys
represented claimants before ODAR.” Office of Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin.,
A-12-07-17057, Claimant Representatives Barred From Practicing Before the
Social
Security
Administration
1
(2007),
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-12-07-17057.pdf.
95
Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) (explaining that SSA's
adjudication system has replaced the normal adversary procedure with an
investigatory model resulting in inquisitorial proceedings).
96
See 5 U.S.C. §§556-557 (2006); see also supra Part I.A (discussing the
agency intervention and political agenda as hindering the administrative law judges
from executing their duty).
97
See Wolfe, supra note 41, at 225 (alteration in original) (quoting
Memorandum from the Division of Policy and Procedure to the Director, BHA
(Dec. 12, 1977) (on file with Author)).
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SSA's and the claimant's ability to benefit from the
highest quality and most efficient service of the ALJ
corps is undermined by the differing and often
contradictory understanding in various parts of the
Agency of . . . “decisional independence.” This
confusion exists about both the meaning of
“decisional independence,” and the extent to which
such independence limits the otherwise appropriate
authority of the Agency to manage the performance of
the ALJ corps.98
General Counsel Fried thus framed it this way:
[T]o what extent may SSA manage the
performance of the ALJ corps? Inherent in the
concept of “management” is “control.” During the
1980s, SSA “attempted to exercise control” over ALJs
in three respects: (1) it demanded greater ALJ
productivity, (2) it demanded greater consistency in
ALJ decision making, and (3) it altered the
“proportion of cases in which they granted or denied
benefits.”99
The agency focus on control over administrative law judges
stands in stark contrast to the CJRA and the efforts of the federal
courts to endow judges with broader case and pretrial management
authority. Dean and Professor of Law Victor Rosenblum described
the January 1997 memorandum as “[a] prototype of myopic
perception” of administrative law judges and their duties and further
explains that his purpose in writing is “to examine the
dysfunctionality of the General Counsel's narrow conception of

98

Id. at 205-06 (quoting Memorandum from the Division of Policy and
Procedure to the Director, BHA (Dec. 12, 1977) (on file with Author)).
99
Id. at 206 (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible
Bias In Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 481, 483 (1990)).
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impartiality in his memorandum.”100
The issue of judicial independence and a correspondingly
expanded case management role for judges has not beem limited to
SSA. Similar issues have plagued administrative adjudications
within the Department of Agriculture.
It is common knowledge that an absolute
necessary element for the existence of an impartial
adjudicator is judicial independence. However, it is of
great concern to all of us who believe in the idea of
impartiality and fairness that this necessary element of
judicial independence is under such intense
attack. The attacks emanating from those within the
leadership roles of the administrative bureaucracies
include the agencies' leaders and the government
attorneys (Offices of the General Counsel) in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and [SSA].101
This restrictive view of the role of administrative law judges
within the agency is evident in its earlier actions. While Congress
and the federal courts were struggling to combat increasing delay and
rising costs in a perceived effort to keep the courthouse doors open in
1989, the agency was withdrawing resources from its administrative
law judges. In a 1989 Report to the Subcommittee on Social Security
of the House Ways and Means Committee, the GAO noted various
actions to restrain administrative law judges, including the
withdrawal of individual staff and administrative support, placing
staff persons in a shared pool, and, to make matters worse, no longer
serving under the direction of individual judges:
OHA began “pooling” resources within some
hearing offices as a demonstration project in the late
1970s, and expanded it to additional hearing offices in
the early 1980s. Under pooling, ALJs do not have
100

Victor G. Rosenblum, Toward Heightening Impartiality in Social Security
Agency Proceedings Involving Administrative Law Judges, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 58, 58 (1998).
101
Wendell Fennell & Fred Young, Judicial Independence Under Siege, 17 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 211, 211 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
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direct control over their support staff. Some or all
support staff previously assigned to individual ALJs
are now placed in a common staff pool. OHA began
pooling staff to improve efficiency and balance staff
workload.
GAO asked ALJs for their views on the pooling of
decision writers and staff attorneys in their
offices. About two-thirds of the ALJs who responded
said such a reconfiguration had a negative effect on
hearing office operations.102
While the GAO study documented a perceived loss of resources
within the administrative law judge community, “many of the
managers GAO spoke with said that staff pooling provided more
flexibility in using staff and allowed a more balanced workload for
all staff.”103 The question becomes whether the net effect of this and
similar actions effectively places the proverbial cart before the horse.
In a 2006 Social Security Advisory Board report, staffing issues
similar to those raised in 1989 were again questioned:
In discussing these figures on ALJ decisions, we
do not mean to imply that only ALJs have an impact
on the number of decisions. ALJs are only a part,
albeit a very important part, of the hearing
process. They are dependent on others to prepare
cases for hearing and to write decisions after the
hearings. They need staff in those positions in
sufficient quantity and quality.
In fact, many ALJs and management officials have
told us that their most urgent need is support staff
rather than additional ALJs. We have heard that the
type of support staff needed varies from office to
office. In some offices there is a shortage of case
technicians to prepare cases for hearing. In others, a

102

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO HRD-90-15, Many Administrative
Law Judges Oppose Productivity Measures 4 (1989) [hereinafter GAO HRD-9015, Productivity Measures].
103
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lack of decision writers creates a bottleneck. In 2005,
the median office had between 4 and 4.5 staff
members (decision writers, case technicians, and other
support staff, excluding those designated as
management). This is fewer than the peak in 2001 of
5.4 staff members per judge. Our analysis of the data
from 2002 through 2005 shows that, as staff-to-judge
ratios increase, dispositions per judge also tend to
increase and average processing time tends to
decline.104
The GAO study recounts a long history of tension between the
agency and its judges, highlighting the continuing debate over the
manner of judicial functioning:
Conflicts between OHA management and ALJs
have existed for at least a decade. Some issues that
divided management and ALJs in the late 1970s and
early 1980s are still argued today. For example, in
June 1977, five ALJs filed a lawsuit alleging that
SSA's use of numerical production goals and related
matters violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution. This case was settled in June 1979,
in what is commonly referred to as the “Bono
agreement,” in which SSA and the five ALJs agreed to
certain policy and practice changes.
In the early 1980s, another disagreement arose
over criteria OHA management used in selecting ALJ
decisions for review. Commonly known as Bellmon
reviews, OHA management selected cases for review
based on a judge's high allowance rates. ALJs
disagreed with the selection process, claiming
interference with their decisional independence. In
1983, the Association of Administrative Law Judges,
which represents about 50 percent of SSA's ALJs,
filed suit seeking an injunction against targeted
Bellmon reviews. On June 21, 1984, before the court

104

Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., supra note 40, at 14.
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ruled on the suit, OHA rescinded the policy of
targeting for review ALJs who had high allowance
rates.105
Herein, perhaps, lies the genesis of much of the current debate
between the agency and the administrative judiciary. Judges have, in
recent times, reversed agency administrative decisions at a greater
rate than they have affirmed such determinations. In significant part,
this is because a claimant's condition worsens over time. Other
factors include the fact that claimants are now overwhelmingly
represented at a hearing; such proceedings usually embrace the first
face-to-face encounter between the claimant and a decisionmaker, all
previous decisions having been a paper or “file review.”
Decisions by administrative law judges, then, invoke the human
factor—largely unaccounted for by the agency in earlier
administrative denials. In effect, the judge is reversing the earlier
agency determination, resulting in a statistically greater frequency of
“paying cases” than at lower administrative levels. Judicial decisions
thus cost the agency, whose budget must then account for the greater
number of pay cases than originally contemplated. As the GAO noted
in 2002 in assessing “five initiatives to improve SSA's disability
claims process”:
[A]ccording to SSA, more denied claimants would
appeal to ALJs under the Prototype [hearing process]
than under the traditional process. More appeals
would result in additional claimants waiting
significantly longer for final agency decisions on their
claims, and would increase workload pressures on
SSA hearings offices, which are already experiencing
considerable case backlogs. It would also result in
higher administrative costs under the Prototype than
under the traditional process. More appeals would
also result in more awards from ALJs and overall and
higher benefit costs under the Prototype than under the

105

GAO HRD-90-15, Productivity Measures, supra note 102, at 12 (footnotes
omitted).
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traditional process.106
High reversal rates by judges of agency disability determinations
have led the agency to conclude that there is (or must be) a
correspondingly high error rate among such decisions, in turn leading
the agency to exert greater control over the claims
process. Evidently, the agency assumes its administrative
determinations are more likely to be correct than the judicial
decisions of its judges. These issues came to the fore, as noted
earlier,107 with the initiation of the so-called Bellmon review (named
after legislation sponsored by then-U.S. Senator Henry Bellmon of
Oklahoma)--a program that contemplated heightened review of
administrative law judge-issued “favorable” decisions.108 A 1989
GAO report summarizes the intensified scrutiny of such decisions:
Based partly on the results of a 1981 study of
3,600 ALJ decisions, which concluded among other
things that there was a higher probability of error in
favorable decisions of those ALJs with high overall
allowance rates, SSA decided to implement the
amendment by directing its Bellmon reviews at those
ALJs with allowance rates of 70 percent or
higher. Entire hearing offices were targeted if their
collective allowance rate was 74 percent or
higher. Targeted ALJs were required to forward all
favorable decisions (allowances) to the Appeals
Council for review before their effectuation or
finalization. . . . ALJs whose decisions were often
objected to were to be given counseling, retraining,
and eventually subjected to “disciplinary or remedial”
measures. By 1983, OHA was using the own-motion
rates (analyst referrals to the Appeals Council) to
decide which ALJs would be targeted for review.109
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See, e.g., GAO-02-322, Disappointing Results, supra note 56, at 3.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
108
See GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews, supra note 46, at 1.
109
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In effect, the agency determined to “discipline” or remediate (in
some cases, “retrain”) judges.110 This resulted in federal litigation in
1983, which revealed, among other things, that the “Associate
Commissioner for Hearings and Appeals had a performance goal in
his Senior Executive Service contract to reduce ALJ allowance
rates.”111
Critically, the court found:
With reason, plaintiff and its members viewed
defendants' combined actions as a message to ALJs to
tip the balance against claimants in close cases to
avoid reversal or remand by the Appeals Council,
which would increase their own motion rate, which
would result in being placed on Bellmon Review, with
the added potential for peer counseling and [Merit
Systems Protection Board] proceedings.112
The clear agency perception was that the collective error in
decisionmaking was by judges and not the underlying policies or
initiatives of its administrators. In effect, the agency ascribed error to
judicial decisionmaking, looking to its own analysts as a baseline
against which administrative law judge decisionmaking was
measured. Thus, agency initiatives since that time specifically
address the question of “inconsistencies” between the underlying
administrative decisionmakers and the judges113 and have sought to
rectify the issue through more benign methods, including “process
unification.” As pointed out in a 2004 GAO study, however, the
assessment of inconsistency is itself subject to question:
110

See Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 113738 (D.D.C. 1984).
111
GAO/HRD-89-48BR, Required Reviews, supra note 46, at 8.
112
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1139.
113
See Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-95-233, Social Security
Disability: Management Action and Program Redesign Needed to Address LongStanding Problems 1 (1995) (statement of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security
Issues, Health, Education, and Human Services Division: “In summary, our work
shows that SSA has serious problems managing the disability programs on several
separate but related fronts. First, the lengthy and complicated decision-making
process results in untimely decisions, especially for those who appeal, and shows
troubling signs of inconsistency, which compromise the integrity of the process.”).
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SSA's assessments have not provided a clear
understanding of the extent and causes of possible
inconsistencies in decisions between adjudication
levels. The two measures SSA uses to monitor
inconsistency of decisions have weaknesses, such as
not accounting for the many factors that can affect
decision outcomes, and therefore do not provide a true
picture of the changes in consistency. Furthermore,
SSA has not sufficiently assessed the causes of
possible inconsistency. For example, SSA conducted
an analysis in 1994 that identified potential areas of
inconsistency, but it did not employ more
sophisticated techniques--such as multivariate
analyses, followed by in-depth case studies--that
would allow the agency to identify and address the
key areas and leading causes of possible
inconsistency. SSA has yet to repeat or expand upon
this 10-year-old study.114
More than any other indicator, this illustrates the inapposite
worldviews represented by the nonjudicial and judicial actors in the
system. Even the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB), a
bipartisan Presidential advisory panel,115 has seen a need to call for a
restoration of the relationship between the agency and its
administrative law judges, pointing to a “residue of mistrust that goes
back at least as far as the late 1970s, when pressures to reduce the
number of allowances and increase the number of decisions led to a
situation that was described as ‘an agency at war with itself.”’116 The
2006 SSAB Report urges the agency and its judges to work with one
another, recognizing the inherent and long-standing differing views
of each.
114

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-04-656, More Effort Needed to
Assess Consistency of Disability Decisions, at Highlights (2004).
115
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The agency's operational milieu, as evidenced by repeated agency
action which excludes the administrative judiciary from
policymaking, ignores the inherent expertise and experience the
judges bring to the unique field of judicial case management. 117 This
is most clearly seen in the recent February 8, 2008, Office of
Inspector General Audit Report (2008 Report) titled Administrative
Law Judges' Caseload Performance.118 Instead of focusing on
creative potential within the existing regulatory scheme by which
administrative law judges may assume an expanded judicial role,
bringing to bear their talents, training, and experience in a wider case
management role, the 2008 Report, like the 1997 Office of General
Counsel (OGC) Memorandum, ignores the call of the SSAB for
reconciliation and seeks to reinforce the idea that judges may be held
accountable for even greater productivity standards.
117

One noted commentator writes:
The term “federal administrative judiciary” is not frequently
used, but it highlights the relationship between the administrative
decision system and the federal judiciary. Administrative
deciders are significant participants in our constitutional
scheme....
Administrative Law Judges as a group are among the most
diversely talented, well-trained, and deeply entrenched
adjudicators in our system, even when they are compared with
the federal district and state judiciary. There are almost 1,200
ALJs who are assigned to 30 federal agencies. This is
approximately equivalent to the number of judges on the federal
trial bench . . . .
....
A survey concludes...in education, training and experience,
they seem no less qualified than bankruptcy judges and
magistrates, if not members of the federal bench . . . . They enjoy
a more secure tenure and compensation than do bankruptcy
judges or magistrates because they do not serve terms. Rather,
they effectively receive life tenure subject to removal for good
cause . . . . These protections provide ALJs with a certain degree
of judicial independence.

Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1341, 1343-45 (1992).
118
See Office of the Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., A-07-07-17072,
Administrative Law Judges' Caseload Performance 3-4 (2008) [hereinafter OIG
Report], http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-07-07-17072.pdf.
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The 2008 Report, like its 1997 OGC counterpart, appears to
challenge the scope of judicial independence arguing that its
protections be subordinated to the demands of production. “Federal
legislation,” it states, “does not prevent SSA from establishing a
performance accountability process wherein ALJs are held to
reasonable production goals, as long as the goals do not infringe on
ALJs' qualified decisional independence.”119
In making this
assertion, the 2008 Report cites, among other authorities, Nash v.
Bowen.120 The Nash court explained:
The setting of reasonable production goals, as
opposed to fixed quotas, is not in itself a violation of
the APA. The district court explicitly found that the
numbers at issue constituted reasonable goals as
opposed to unreasonable quotas. Judge Elfvin
explained that
[a] minimum number of dispositions an ALJ
must decide in a given period, provided this
number is reasonable and not “etched in
stone”, is not a prescription of how, or how
quickly, an ALJ should decide a particular
case. It does not dictate the content of the
decision.121
The 2008 Report calls for “performance accountability
procedures” to be established, examining through the course of the
Report various “what if” scenarios (projecting the resulting backlog
reduction if individual judges decided 400, 450, 500, or 550 cases per
year).122 The 2008 Report concludes that backlog reduction can be
achieved by simply imposing a goal and demanding (under penalty of
accountability procedures) that judges meet the goal, with no other
changes to case management procedures or processes through which
expanded and creative judicial management methods can be brought
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to bear during the life of the case. In this, it evokes the earlier
Bellmon review and ignores the Bono Settlement Agreement of
1979.123 The 2008 Report typifies the agency's cultural stance,
looking at judges not as a valued repository of expertise but as
extensions of bureaucratic will—demanding they do more, but
confining such further activity to a narrow band of crystallized action
and banning heightened case management authority.
The 2008 Report contemplates continuing a jurisprudence
founded on the same model as has stood for multiple decades. It fails
to embrace the SSAB call for collaboration generally and makes no
proposals to encourage a collaborative effort to resolve caseload
management and the backlog specifically. Instead, it mirrors that
which has been. The agency--regardless of the efficacy of its
underlying position with respect to goals and productivity--continues
a seeming adversarial stance with its judges, isolating the judges in
an ever-narrowing and circumscribed decisionmaking window,
effectively the reciprocal course taken by Congress and the federal
courts.124
IV. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN A NEW VENUE?
One alternative previously unaddressed in this Article is
whether there should even be a push for an expanded case
management role for administrative law judges within SSA. Some
argue that the ideal solution is a change of venue--the creation of an
independent corps of administrative law judges which would, by
definition not be subject to the bureaucratic stricture of any given
agency, but which would nevertheless have responsibility for
independent adjudication of all administrative appeals currently
heard by administrative law judges across executive branch agencies.
This view finds support in an unexpected manner. While many
have debated the continuing role of the federal administrative
judiciary within the Executive Branch, arguments that urge a
separation of administrative law judges from their respective
123

See Bono, supra note 34.
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agencies, and that have at their core supposed threats to the integrity
of the administrative decisionmaking process, have not won the
day. Over time, the issues have come to center not so much on the
question of integrity of the decisionmaking process but on effective
functioning. A brief overview of the various arguments highlights
this distinction.
A 1985 article in the ABA Journal titled Breaking Away:
Administrative Law Judges Seek Freer Status recounts the
introduction of legislation some twenty-five years ago whose purpose
was “to consolidate federal administrative law judges into an
independent corps.”125
The arguments then centered on the
appearance of bias as well as undue influence: “Advocates of the
corps concept say it would eliminate an appearance of bias that exists
because judges work for agencies whose cases they hear . . . .”126
One writer points out that it is the need “to protect the integrity,
independence and impartiality of administrative law judges”127 that
fuels the call for reform in federal administrative adjudication. The
Honorable Charles N. Bono, then an administrative law judge at SSA
who chaired the ABA National Conference of Administrative Law
Judges in 1992, explained that “[t]he tension between an agency's
administrators and its ALJs is magnified by the fact that the
employing agency has an agenda that may conflict with the judges'
responsibility to provide parties with due process.”128 Judge Bono
further clarified his point in testimony in an April 29, 1992 hearing of
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations: “ALJs have been subjected to monthly
performance targets set by agencies; rankings, ratings and
evaluations of individual performances; and threats of removal,
reprimand or deprivation of staff and equipment if targets are not
met.”129
Those opposed to this view argue that this is a nonissue, as
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evidence of bias has not been raised.130 Note, however, the plaintiff's
argument in Richardson v. Perales in 1971, raising essentially this
very argument:
Finally, the claimant complains of the system of
processing disability claims. He suggests, and is
joined in this by the briefs of amici, that the
Administrative Procedure Act, rather than the Social
Security Act, governs the processing of claims and
specifically provides for cross-examination. The
claimant goes on to assert that in any event the hearing
procedure is invalid on due process grounds. He says
that the hearing examiner has the responsibility for
gathering the evidence and “to make the Government's
case as strong as possible”; that naturally he leans
toward a decision in favor of the evidence he has
gathered; that justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice; and that an “independent hearing examiner
such as in the” Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act should be provided.131--an
argument the Supreme Court then rejected:
Neither are we persuaded by the advocatejudge-multiple-hat suggestion. It assumes too
much and would bring down too many
procedures designed, and working well, for a
governmental structure of great and growing
complexity. The social security hearing
examiner, furthermore, does not act as
counsel. He acts as an examiner charged with
developing the facts.132
The Author questioned, in an earlier writing, “Would the court
today hold that delays in decisionmaking of between one and two
years violate fundamental due process, if not the public policy
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Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1971) (citations omitted).
132
Id. at 410.
131

Spring 2013

Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications

187

underlying these benefits? Would it look to the ‘governmental
structure of great and growing complexity’ of 2010 and still declare
that it is ‘working well?”’133
In a more temperate assessment, the difference between a judge
sitting in a court of law and an administrative law judge in the
Executive Branch is described as not so much a difference in
functioning, as both must strive for impartiality, but as a question of
constitutional structure:
The instinctive defensive reaction to a claim that
the administrative adjudicator is controlled by the
agency she serves may be to raise the vigorous
assertion that due process requires the ALJ be
independent of the agency she serves. The distinctions
between judges of the judicial branch and those of the
executive branch are such, however, as to call into
question such a conclusion. At the outset, it is
important to note the distinctions that courts have
already made that set apart the executive judiciary
from the judicial branch adjudicators: that
“[a]dministrative decisionmakers do not bear all the
badges of independence that characterize an Article III
judge, but they are held to the same standard of
impartial decisionmaking.” Though it may be
appealing for ALJs to believe they must operate
independent of their agency, constitutional
jurisprudence does not support a claim that due
process mandates such independence. Rather, if we
conclude that as ALJs we must “avoid, and should be
shielded as much as possible from, any influences that
might in any way compromise such independence,
neutrality, and impartiality,” as Judge Young has
recommended, we must find bases for this mandate
other than those found in the Due Process Clause of
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for Social Security, 29 J. NAT'L ASSN. OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 515, 543-44 (2009)
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the Constitution.134
Judge McNeil aptly points out “that by the 1930s the
administrative court was entrenched and expanding, sharing much of
the same apparent authority as that possessed by article III courts,
without the constitutional protection of life tenure and undiminished
salary.”135 Administrative decisionmaking was ratified by the
Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson:
[The case] assumed that public rights disputes may
not require a judicial decision at either the original or
appellate levels. Even in private rights cases, Crowell
held, an administrative tribunal may make findings of
fact and render an initial decision of legal and
constitutional questions, as long as there is an
adequate review available in a constitutional court.136
Critically, however, Judge McNeil notes that the inherent
relationship between the administrative law judge and the agency
within which he or she sits is a creature of the APA.
The ALJ serves an executive function not shared
by the article III judge: her authority is no greater than
that of the agency she serves, and as an adjudicator
she is charged with an affirmative ethical obligation to
perform judicial or quasi-judicial tasks in the context
of the executive agency's mandate, not independent of
that agency, for she has no authority independent of
that agency.137
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Against this backdrop, the question arises whether it is now time
for SSA's administrative law judges to migrate to a separate
adjudicative agency, or even to an Article I court similar to that of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.
In examining the question, the issue is not whether there is a need
for such action based on arguments of threats to the integrity of
administrative law judge decisionmaking, agency influence, or the
appearance of bias, but rather whether the agency, as a politically
animated entity tasked with responsibility for such decisionmaking,
has effectively forfeited its responsibility by virtue of continued
ineffective action in dealing with the problem. More to the point, has
the agency, by virtue of its continued animus in its relationship with
its administrative law judges, made a migration of this corps of
administrative decisionmakers a virtual necessity such that to do
anything less would result in the continuity of the pending backlog?
The answer to these questions lies in both a historical as well as
functional view of the agency and its conduct. Repeated actions
since the mid-1970s have signaled agency intention to more closely
manage administrative decisionmaking. As such, the issues are not
new. In a 1991 article in the Notre Dame Law Review, Professor
Daniel Gifford writes:
The focus of these debates has been the
relationship between the Department's Social Security
Administration and the administrative law judges, and,
in particular, the extent to which the Secretary of
Health and Human Services may legitimately attempt
to influence the ways in which the administrative law
judges work.
The SSA has justified its management initiatives
as designed to improve the quality and efficiency of
the social security program. They are designed, it is
said, to foster efficient disposition of caseloads, to
reduce inconsistency in results, and to hold back the
dramatic increases in cost which have afflicted the
administrative judges are no less judges, but are not independent as are judges in
the Judicial Branch and are nevertheless required to be impartial in presiding over
hearings).
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program in recent years. Many administrative law
judges, however, have viewed these supervisory
initiatives from the Secretary as intrusions upon their
independence which they have challenged in the
courts. Disability claimants have also been quick to
assert that these management efforts have interfered
with their right to an impartial decision.138
A crucial failing, in Professor Gifford's view, has been the failure
by the agency to promulgate precise procedural rules and thereby
attain greater consistency in adjudicative decisionmaking:
But the SSA has been unable or unwilling to
formulate other policies with sufficient clarity and
comprehensiveness to reduce the disparity among the
way ALJs decide cases. In the absence of precise and
binding rules, the SSA has resorted to quality control
programs and other management techniques. This
novel approach to mass adjudication has forced a new
and more precise examination of the extent to which
management techniques can properly be classified as
part of the policy control which belongs to the
agency.139
This inaction has continued to the present. No comprehensive
formal rules of procedure for disability hearings exist, and indeed,
repeated calls by administrative law judges to enact rules that would
at least close the record after a hearing have fallen on deaf ears. Even
today, post-hearing, a claimant can discover new evidence and
submit it as part of an appeal with the administrative law judge never
having seen the documents. As Professor Gifford points out, “It is
difficult for the SSA to complain of inconsistent decisionmaking by
administrative law judges and yet fail to promulgate corrective rules.
If ALJ decisions are heavily inconsistent, then large numbers of them
are apparently wrong.”140 Arguably, then, if large numbers are
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wrong, why has the agency been reluctant to implement rules of
procedure designed to streamline and facilitate the decisional
process, effectively akin to those adopted by the Judicial Branch
when it faced a similar impending crisis of cost and delay? Professor
Gifford further observes:
[I]f the SSA can conclude that administrative law
judges inconsistently decide similar cases, the SSA
may be able to reduce the issues to written form and
provide for the resolution of those issues by rule. In
short, the very ability of the SSA to identify
inconsistencies in ALJ decisionmaking suggests that
those inconsistencies could be reduced through
increased rulemaking.141
In the years since Professor Gifford's writings, the agency has
continued to employ “quality control programs and other
management techniques.”142 It has done so despite repeated audits
by the GAO demonstrating that SSA's “techniques” have not worked,
and continues in this path to the present time. In Professor Gifford's
words, “This novel approach to mass adjudication has forced a new
and more precise examination of the extent to which management
techniques can properly be classified as part of the policy control
which belongs to the agency.”143
In 2003 the Honorable Robin Arzt, serving as an administrative
law judge with the SSA, in a comprehensive analytical writing,
proposed what is virtually a blueprint for a new, separate
adjudicatory agency to hear and decide Social Security disability
appeals. She terms this agency the “United States Office of Hearings
and Appeals (USOHA).”144 She proposed an adjudicatory agency
having
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exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative
decisions of Social Security Act Titles II, XVI and
XVIII benefits claims. The USOHA would have
permissive jurisdiction over other classes of cases, so
it may hear and decide other classes of cases such as
those that the SSA ALJs have heard in the past. The
final administrative adjudication authority of SSA and
[the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS)] would be abolished, including the SSA
Appeals Council and DHHS Medicare Appeals
Council.145
Judge Arzt also proposed:
An individual ALJ's decision would be appealed to
appellate panel staffed by ALJs, which would consist
of three ALJs who would review the cases
locally. The ALJ appellate panels would be akin to
the United States Bankruptcy Court appellate panels. .
..
The final decisions of the USOHA would be
appealable only to the federal courts, with the District
Courts as the first step in the judicial review.146
Notably, Judge Arzt proposes agency independence through
appointment of a “Chief Administrative Law Judge . . . by the
President from the ranks of the ALJs.”147 A critical hallmark of such
an independent adjudicatory agency is the ability of such a body to
do what the agency has not to this point been able to accomplish:
“The USOHA would set its own rules of practice and procedure and
the ALJs would administer the agency.”148 She argues the need for
such an independent agency as predicated on a recognized need for
effective adjudicatory functioning free from political or policy
concerns-- issues that now plague the agency:

145

Id. at 274.
Id. at 274-75.
147
Id. at 275.
148
Id.
146

Spring 2013

Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications

193

There is an inherent, and often real, conflict
between (1) the need for independent and impartial
appellate
administrative
decisionmakers
and
decisions, and (2) Executive Branch agency
policymakers' desire to control the decisionmakers and
the outcome of their decisions to conform to policy
and political concerns. This conflict results in agency
policymakers' intrusions into the administrative
adjudication function.
Many of the same rationales that justify Congress'
creation of specialized independent Article I courts to
perform the initial judicial review of final
administrative decisions by Executive Branch
agencies also support the separation of the appellate
administrative adjudication function from Executive
Branch agencies. This is done to promote decisional
independence
from
the
agencies'
policymaking/rulemaking, prosecutorial/enforcement
and investigatory functions.149
Judge Arzt cites to other, similar legislation by Congress,
including the establishment of the U.S. Tax Court, the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, as well as congressional action to
create the Board of Tax Appeals “to provide an independent tribunal
to hear taxpayers' appeals from tax deficiency notices before payment
of the tax after a Congressionally created board studied the IRS
appellate review practices.” That board concluded:
[I]t would never be possible to give to the taxpayer
the fair and independent review to which he is of right
entitled as long as the appellate tribunal is directly
under, and its recommendations subject to the
approval of, the officer whose duty it is to administer
the law and collect the tax. As long as the appellate
tribunal is part and parcel of the collecting machinery
it can hardly maintain the attitude essential to a
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judicial tribunal.150
A similar rationale, she argues, applies here. Furthermore, in a
mass-justice system such as the Social Security disability appeals
system, which literally decides hundreds of thousands of cases
annually, the policymaking function often times served by
administrative law judges through adjudicatory decisionmaking is
absent. Such absence effectively moots the need for continued
agency oversight of the adjudicatory function, since no policymaking
function is thereby served.
[W]hen an agency no longer formulates policy
through its adjudication function but does so only
through rulemaking, which is the case for SSA and
[DHHS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services],
supervision of the appellate administrative
adjudicators and review of their decisions by policymaking political appointees has no reason to
continue. At that point, there is no reason to keep the
adjudicatory function within the agency.151
Others agree, noting that “[i]n the benefit agencies, the efficient
disposition of a large volume of benefit claims demands the use of
relatively precise standards, whose applications do not raise
significant policy issues.”152 Mass-justice systems such as SSA do
not formulate policy through adjudicatory decisionmaking, rendering
even more significant the agency's failure to implement
comprehensive rules of hearing procedure:
In a mass-justice agency, adjudication is unsuited
for use as a vehicle for announcing or formulating
policy. The cases come too fast and in too great a
volume for decisionmakers to look to other cases as
guides; sorting out, distinguishing or following large
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volumes of cases whose holdings are necessarily
circumscribed by their unique factual configurations is
impractical. Thus, in a mass-justice agency, the
agency head does not rely on adjudication to control
policy and, accordingly, does not sit as a final
adjudicator. Moreover, the removal of the agency
head from control of adjudication is fully consistent
with the agency head's policy responsibility because
no individual case is programmatically salient. The
agency head is not concerned with the disposition of
any one case, but with the policies applied to large
classes of cases.153
The question is not an issue of judicial independence, for the
administrative law judge is indeed a creature of the APA, which in
turn defines the administrative law judge function as a derivative
one.154 Rather, the question for the agency and for Congress is an
issue of effective functioning--of carrying the congressional mandate
embodied within the Social Security Act forward in a meaningfully
timely manner. Judge Arzt critically notes that the proposed USOHA
should properly be a part of the agency, but with direct lines of
authority equivalent to the Commissioner with a presidentially
appointed chief administrative law judge endowed with the ability to
formulate rules of procedure necessary for effective adjudication.155
The functional purpose of such an adjudicative agency is to free the
administrative judiciary within the agency from the miasma of
policies, programs, and initiatives that, having been repeatedly tried,
have not succeeded in addressing a decades-long mounting backlog.
Administrative law judges, tasked with the need to hear and
decide can effectively construct and administer a system of hearings
and appeals consistent with their professional worldview, experience,
training, and expertise. The ability to accomplish what, to date, the
agency has failed to do--establish rules of procedure--would
significantly enhance proactive case management by administrative
law judges who, like their Article III brethren, could become
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involved in a case from the outset of the appeal, furthering a far more
timely resolution than currently exists. Many case management
techniques can be employed to enhance the decisionmaking process,
even in the hybrid jurisprudence now framed as nonadversarial by
existing agency regulation.156 Meaningful judicial case management
requires no less.
V. FROM HERE, WHERE?
The wheel has effectively turned full circle. In 1989 the
problem, as defined by SSA and recounted by the GAO, was a
question of consistency between the judges and the agency. The socalled Bellmon review catapulted the agency and its administrative
law judges into federal court with allegations by the agency of
erroneous decisions on the part of the judges and claims by
administrative law judges of infringement of judicial independence-accompanied by an allegation that a Senior Executive Service bonus
provision was tied to a reduction in administrative law judge
“reversals.”157
In 2012, the question asked by the agency is now not so
concerned with consistency as it is with numbers. How many
decisions can an administrative law judge decide? The 2008 Report
references Commissioner Astrue's statement that judges have now
been asked to decide between 500 and 700 cases annually.158 This is
an increase in expectations that many judges have attempted to meet
with varying degrees of success depending on staffing, scheduling,
and accounting for the individual differences in complexity each case
brings. Judges have further noted that a statistically significant
number of cases have little to do with disability per se, being instead
issues of overpayment, appeals on nonmedical entitlement issues
(such as income and resources), and issues relating to retirement.
While it would be a welcome end to say that a solution was
reached and the agency and administrative law judges are working
together in much the same fashion as did the courts with members of
156
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the bar and Congress in implementing the CJRA, such has not been
and is not now the case. Instead, the manner in which the
administrative law judge functions has remained almost unchanged,
apart from the request for and production of increasing numbers of
dispositions. No broad-sweeping procedural changes have been
implemented that would allow a judge to become involved in a case
upon the filing of a Request for Hearing; nor, in fact, have any rules
of procedure actually been enacted.
Remarkably, with the difficulties illustrated by the Bellmon
review and the long-standing debate over the meaning and scope of
decisional independence, the administrative law judge remains at the
center of the solution to the backlog crisis, though little has been
done to enhance the judicial role or function in the hearings
process. The current configuration is, functionally, a counterevolutionary or retrograde step back from 1989, reflecting the
removal of individual judicial staffing. The current hearing office
configuration also reflects changes following the Hearing Process
Improvement initiative, with a further refinement of pooled staffing
into administrative groups headed by a group supervisor, potentially
further distancing the judge from support staff. As the Figure below
clearly shows, the administrative law judge has no direct supervision
over support staff.
Figure 1159 depicts the current hearing office configuration:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS
POINT IS OMMITTED
The hearings process is depicted by the GAO at Figure 2:160
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS
POINT IS OMMITTED
The “hearings level” description in Figure 2 describes only three
administrative law judge activities:
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• Administrative law judge prehearing review;
• Administrative law judge conduct of a hearing; and
• Administrative law judge issuance of a decision (which may
or may not be written by the issuing judge).
No in-depth study has been conducted to mirror that called for by
the CJRA, examining the hearings process and the procedures by
which the administrative law judge functions. No study has
examined the potential role of the administrative law judge in
nonadversarial versus adversarial jurisprudence; nor has any
comparative study been undertaken to determine if additional benefit
can be derived from assigning a case to a judge from the time it is
filed--that is, from the time a request for hearing before an
administrative law judge is made.
The evident assumption in the ensuing silence is that the
administrative law judge is only to hear and decide the case when it
is before him or her for decision. Thus, the only contemplated
judicial activity prior to a hearing is to read (review) the case file
once it is assigned for hearing. Once a case is assigned to a judge, he
or she may also indicate whether prehearing case development is
necessary, either in the form of obtaining records or scheduling
consultative examinations, or may, after a hearing, order such
examinations.
These activities occur within the narrow time frame,
comparatively speaking, that by definition comes at the relative end
of the life of the case once it is pending at ODAR. Figure 3
diagrammatically depicts the life of a case and the narrow role of the
administrative law judge (the superimposed triangle) in that life.
Figure 3:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL OMITTED
The inverted cone in Figure 3 illustrates the narrow scope of
judicial involvement at the end of the life of the case before ODAR-and stands in contrast to a depiction of judicial involvement in a case
before the federal courts, as shown in Figure 4:
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL OMITTED
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Failing to provide innovation and creativity in the conduct of the
hearings process, when coupled with a reluctance to address even
basic questions, such as closing the record to the post-hearing receipt
of evidence, much less formulation of a comprehensive set of rules of
procedure,161 reduces the mandate of greater productivity to a simple
command to “pedal faster.”
The agency's administrative judiciary is keenly aware of the
backlog and of the human price paid for delay, and has endeavored to
redress the situation with increasing case dispositions working within
the existing infrastructure. This is far from ideal. Instead, there is,
and has been, a continuing need for comprehensive reform of the
scope and breadth as was undertaken by Congress with the passage
of the CJRA. The agency has been aware of and has been attempting
to redress the backlog crisis since the late 1980s. It has not
succeeded. Despite the expenditure of millions of dollars, no actions
have been taken to empower the federal administrative judiciary to
parallel the revolution in judicial management in the federal
courts. However, it stands undisputed that the agency's
administrative adjudicatory system is the largest of its kind in the
world.
Standing as a gleaming example of a successful attack on the
burden of cost and delay is the success of the CJRA. It has been an
effective mechanism for reduction of cost and delay in the federal
courts. Despite this, no hue and cry has been raised for SSA to
implement the same unique innovation undertaken to avert spiraling
cost and delay facing the federal courts in 1989. The growing delay
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Some arguments have been made by representatives or claimants'
organizations that to “close the record” or develop enforceable rules of procedure
would somehow harm claimants. In truth, are they not harmed to a greater extent
having to wait? Given that more than 80% of all claimants are now represented by
counsel who are by definition equipped to deal with the requirements of such rules,
little actual harm can be foreseen. Instead, the absence of rules of procedure signal
a lack of accountability for representatives and leave open a hearings process which
can only benefit from innovative and creative procedural rules designed to
accomplish here what the Civil Justice Reform Act and its progeny have done for
the federal courts. Is it possible to decide a case without a full hearing? The answer
is yes. Should we discuss whether a non-adversarial jurisprudence continues as the
best course in light of overwhelming representation in today's system? The answer
is yes. Should comprehensive rules of procedure be established to ensure a case is
ready for hearing if a hearing is required? The answer, again, is yes.
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and costs in the federal courts were of such magnitude as to cause
then-Senator Biden to call for congressional action in the passage of
the CJRA as necessary to “grant federal courts the requisite
autonomy, resources, and direction to bring about systemic reform
and to solve the mounting crisis of litigation costs and delays.”162
More than business as usual is required to save the Nation's
system of disability appeals. The inertia of past practices and
documented animus must be overcome and creative measures
employed in the framing of a renewed decisionmaking paradigm.
Both the agency and its cadre of administrative law judges must
embrace the call of the Social Security Advisory Board to change
SSA's relationship with its administrative law judges from “one of
confrontation to cooperation.”163 In the highest ideals of public
service, to serve the American people, it is time to empower the
federal administrative judiciary--talented, capable, highly motivated
men and women, dedicated to public service--and allow them the
same opportunity to employ equal, if not greater, measures of
creativity and judicial innovation witnessed during the past twenty
years in the federal courts.
All this will not be finished in the first hundred
days. Nor will it be finished in the first thousand
days, nor in the life of this administration, nor even
perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us
begin.
–John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
35th President (1961-1963).164
APPENDIX I: THROUGH THE EYES OF THE GAO—SUMMARY OF KEY
GAO REPORTS
Collected key GAO reports addressing the backlog of disability
appeals cases reflect a growing caseload punctuated with repeated
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Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Charting the Future of Social Security's Disability
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attempts by the agency to “plug the gap,” with little success.
GAO Report 02-322
A 2002 report characterizes the agency's actions as
“disappointing,” examining four agency efforts that the GAO found
had only limited or no success:
SSA has implemented four of the five disability claims process
initiatives either nationwide or within selected geographic
locations. As summarized below, the improvements realized through
their implementation have, in general, been disappointing.
• The Disability Claim Manager Initiative. This initiative was
completed in June 2001. Results of the pilot test, which was done at
36 locations in 15 states beginning in November 1999, were mixed;
claims were processed faster and customer and employee satisfaction
improved, but administrative costs were substantially higher. An SSA
evaluation of the test concluded that the overall results were not
compelling enough to warrant additional testing or implementation of
the Disability Claim Manager at this time.
• The Prototype. This initiative was implemented in 10 states in
October 1999 and continues to operate only in these states.
Preliminary results indicate that the Prototype is moving in the
direction of meeting its objective of ensuring that legitimate claims
are awarded as early in the process as possible. Compared with their
non-Prototype counterparts, the DDSs [disability determination
services] operating under the Prototype are awarding a higher
percentage of claims at the initial decision level, while the overall
accuracy of their decisions is comparable with the accuracy of
decisions made under the traditional process. In addition, when DDSs
operating under the Prototype deny claims, appeals reach a hearing
office about 70 days faster than under the traditional process because
the Prototype eliminates the reconsideration step in the appeals
process. However, according to SSA, more denied claimants would
appeal to administrative law judges under the Prototype than under
the traditional process. More appeals would result in additional
claimants waiting significantly longer for final agency decisions on
their claims, and would increase workload pressures on SSA hearings
offices, which are already experiencing considerable case backlogs. It
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would also result in higher administrative costs under the Prototype
than under the traditional process. More appeals would also result in
more awards from administrative law judges and overall and higher
benefit costs under the Prototype than under the traditional process.
Because of this, SSA acknowledged in December 2001 that it would
not extend the Prototype to additional states in its current form.
During the next several months, SSA plans to reexamine the
Prototype to determine what revisions are necessary to decrease
overall processing time and to reduce its impact on costs before
proceeding further.
• The Hearings Process Improvement Initiative. This initiative
was implemented nationwide in 2000. The initiative has not
improved the timeliness of decisions on appeals; rather, it has slowed
processing in hearings offices from 318 days to 336 days. As a result,
the backlog of cases waiting to be processed has increased
substantially and is rapidly approaching crisis levels. The initiative
has suffered from problems associated with implementing large-scale
changes too quickly without resolving known problems. SSA is
currently studying the situation in hearing offices to determine what
changes are needed.
• The Appeals Council Process Improvement Initiative. This
initiative was implemented in fiscal year 2000 and has resulted in
some improvements. While it fell short of achieving its goals, the
time required to process a case in the Appeals Council has been
reduced by 11 days to 447 days and the backlog of cases pending
review has been reduced from 144,500 (fiscal year 1999) to 95,400
(fiscal year 2001). Larger improvements in processing times were
limited by, among other things, automation problems and policy
changes.
• The Quality Assurance Initiative. SSA's original (1994) plan to
redesign the disability claims process called for SSA to undertake a
parallel effort to revamp its existing quality assurance system.
However, because of considerable disagreement among internal and
external stakeholders on how to accomplish this difficult objective,
progress has been limited to a contractor's assessment of SSA's
existing quality assurance practices. In March 2001, the contractor
recommended that SSA adopt a broader vision of quality
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management, which would entail a significant overhaul of SSA's
existing system. SSA established a work group to respond to the
contractor report, but no specific proposals have yet been submitted
to the Commissioner for approval.165
GAO Report 08-40
In a December 2007 report, the GAO even assesses the agency
with responsibility for making the situation worse:
While backlogs in processing disability claims
have plagued SSA for many years, several factors
have contributed to their increase in the last decade
including substantial growth in initial applications,
staff losses, and management weaknesses. . .
. Finally, management weaknesses as evidenced by a
number of initiatives that were not successfully
implemented have limited SSA's ability to remedy the
backlog. Several initiatives introduced by SSA in the
last 10 years to improve processing times and
eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the
problem. For example, the “Hearings Process
Improvement” initiative implemented in fiscal year
2000 significantly increased the days it took to
adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced
it.166
The backlog has been present and growing for more than a
quarter century. Even the court in Nash v. Bowen couched its
comments in light of the backlog, commenting: “Moreover, in view
of the significant backlog of cases, it was not unreasonable to expect
administrative law judges to perform at minimally acceptable levels
of efficiency. Simple fairness to claimants awaiting benefits required
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GAO-02-322, Disappointing Results, supra note 56, at 3-4.
GAO-08-40, Better Planning, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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no less.”167
GAO-02-552-T
Though the hearings backlog is longstanding, the manner in
which judges conduct hearings has not changed. A 2004 GAO report
echoes both the issues of increased cost and undue delay that were
the subject of the CJRA, but to date have not been successfully
addressed by the agency:
SSA has experienced difficulty managing its
complex disability determination process, and
consequently faces problems in ensuring the
timeliness, accuracy, and consistency of its disability
decisions. Although SSA has made some gains in the
short term in improving the timeliness of its decisions,
the Commissioner has noted that it still has “a long
way to go.” Over the past 5 years, SSA has slightly
reduced the average time it takes to obtain a decision
on an initial claim from 105 days in fiscal year 1999
to 97 days in fiscal year 2003, and significantly
reduced the average time it takes the Appeals Council
to consider an appeal of a hearing decision from 458
to 294 days over the same period. However, the
average time it takes to receive a decision at the
hearings level has increased by almost a month over
the same period, from 316 days to 344 days.
According to SSA's strategic plan, these delays place a
significant burden on applicants and their families and
an enormous drain on agency resources.
Lengthy processing times have contributed to a
large number of pending claims at both the initial and
hearings levels. While the number of initial disability
claims pending has risen more than 25 percent over
the last 5 years, from about 458,000 in fiscal year
1999 to about 582,000 in fiscal year 2003, the number
of pending hearings has increased almost 90 percent
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over the same time period, from about 312,000 to over
591,000. Some cases that are in the queue for a
decision have been pending for a long time. For
example, of the 499,000 cases pending in June 2002 at
the hearings level, about 346,000 (69 percent) were
over 120 days old, 167,000 (33 percent) were over
270 days old, and 88,500 (18 percent) were over 365
days old.168
GAO Report GAO/T-HEHS-97-118
A 1997 report summarizes the many earlier reports in a
characteristically similar straightforward manner: “Despite SSA
attempts to reduce the backlog through its [Short Term Disability
Project Plan (STDP)] initiatives, the agency did not reach its goal of
reducing this backlog to 375,000 by December 1996.”169
In short, a long series of GAO reports and findings, when
considered together with the various statements of agency officials,
paints a frighteningly simple picture of repeated complex initiatives
(e.g., STDP--short term disability project), process improvements
(e.g., HPI--hearing process improvement), and a string of alternative
decisionmakers (the adjudication officer, the senior attorney, the
federal reviewing official, and similar denominations of nonjudicial
personnel)—all to little or no avail, despite the expenditure of tens of
millions of dollars. And, while hindsight is twenty-twenty, the
public, the agency, and members of Congress stand not now looking
back over twenty-five years for the first time, but having done so
with the eyes of many who have looked and seen similar views over
many years. The gaze of members of Congress, high ranking
officials, and the tenure of multiple Commissioners have seen the
problems, heard the testimony, and witnessed the result.
Still, the backlog persists.
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U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, GAO-02-552T, Social Security Disability:
Commissioner Proposes Strategy To Improve The Claims Process, But Faces
Implementation Challenges 3-4 (2004).
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U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, GAO/T-HEHS-97-118, Social Security
Disability: SSA Actions To Reduce Backlogs And Achieve More Consistent
Decisions Deserve High Priority 3 (1997).
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APPENDIX II: TWENTY YEARS OF SELECTED GAO FINDINGS ON THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BACKLOG (1989–2009)
The Bellmon Review--GAO Letter to the Chairman of
the Social Security Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, Regarding
Suggestions on Ways to Make the Social Security
Appeals Process Less Burdensome
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-HRD-8948BR, Results of Required Reviews of Administrative Law Judge
Decisions (1989), http:// archive.gao.gov/d25t7/139091.pdf.
This article assesses the merits of the Bellmon Review. It finds
that while the reviews appear to be cost effective, they also delay the
payment of benefits and, overall, do not appear to have much value.
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-HRD-90-15,
Many Administrative Law Judges Oppose Productivity Initiatives
(1989), http:// www.gao.gov/assets/150/148485.pdf.
In a report that attempted to determine what caused the recent
conflicts between OHA management and administrative law judges,
GAO found that such conflicts centered around management's
attempts to increase administrative law judges' production
levels. The study further found that the reduction in the number of
administrative law judges was warranted for a four-year period
because of a sharp drop-off in the number of appeals. However,
OHA should have rehired more ALJs when the number of appeals
climbed back to its previous high levels.
1995
GAO Testimony of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income
Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human
Services Division, Before the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
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Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-95233, Social Security Disability: Management Action and Program
Redesign Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems (1995),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106213.pdf.
In this testimony, Jane Ross addressed three areas of concern
about SSA management: (1) “improving the timeliness and
consistency of disability decisions”; (2) “helping more people reduce
their dependence on cash benefits”; and (3) “ensuring that benefits
are going only to those least able to work.”
1996
GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-96-87,
Backlog Reduction Efforts Underway: Significant Challenges
Remain (1996), http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96087.pdf.
The report assesses the growing difficulty SSA faces with respect
to the growing backlog of cases awaiting a hearing decision. The
report finds that the backlog results from “(1) multiple levels of
claims development and decision-making, (2) fragmented program
accountability, (3) decisional disparities between DDS and OHA
adjudicators, and (4) SSA's failure to define and communicate its
management authority over the ALJs.”
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS 96-170,
SSA Disabililty Redesign: More Testing Needed to Assess
Feasibility of New Claim Manager Position (1996),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96170.pdf.
The report evaluates the concerns that come along with the
creation of a new position, the disability claim manager. The report
finds that SSA would benefit by increasing efficiency, better
addressing claimant needs, and reducing processing time. However,
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the report concedes that no test conducted to assess the feasibility of
the new position can be truly accurate at this time.
Testimony Before the Social Security Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Ways and Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-96211, SSA Disability Reengineering: Project Magnitude and
Complexity
Impede
Implementation
(1996),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-HEHS-96211/pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-HEHS-96-211.pdf.
The report provides information on SSA's proposal to redesign its
disability claims process. Specifically, it assesses SSA's vision and
progress for the redesign, the issues related to the scope and
complexity of the redesign, and SSA's efforts to maintain stakeholder
support. The report finds that while the redesign can reduce costs,
save time, and improve the quality of service, the scope of the
redesign's initiatives may jeopardize the likelihood of accomplishing
the goals of the redesign.
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-97-20,
SSA Disability Redesign, Focus Needed on Initiatives Most Crucial
to
Reducing
Costs
and
Time
(1996),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97020.pdf.
This report studies the impact of reengineering, which is a
process used by various organizations “as a means to identify and
quickly put in place dramatic improvements.”
1997
Testimony Before the Social Security Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Ways and Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/T-HEHS-97118, Social Security Disability: SSA Actions to Reduce Backlogs and
Achieve More Consistent Decisions Deserving High Priority (1997),
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http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97118t.pdf.
Jane L. Ross, the Director of Income Security Issues at the
Health, Education, and Human Services Division, testifies on the
actions SSA undertook as they relate to SSA's management of its
Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income
programs. Ross testifies that the actions resulted in the development
of plans that generally improved the management of its programs.
1999
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Human
Resources and the Subcommittee on Social Security,
Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/OCG-99-20,
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration (1999).
This report discusses the corrective actions SSA has undertaken
to address major performance and management challenges, which
have hampered the effectiveness of SSA. While SSA has recently
developed goals for improving its management, this report
emphasizes that the “agency must take actions to address the root
causes of its management and performance weaknesses and ensure
sustained management oversight and attention.”
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-99-25,
SSA Disability Redesign: Actions Needed to Enhance Future
Progress (1999), http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99025.pdf.
The report assesses SSA's efforts to redesign the disability claims
process and identify actions that SSA can take to better ensure future
progress. The report finds that while SSA has made progress overall,
it has yet to meet most of its milestones for testing and implementing
its initiatives.
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
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Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO/HEHS-99-50R,
Social Security: Review of Disability Representatives (1999), http://
archive.gao.gov/paprpdf2/161794.pdf.
This report assesses “(1) the extent to which disability
representatives contribute to decisional delays, (2) other potential
reasons for decisional delays, and (3) additional options available to
SSA to ensure that disability decisions are reached in a more timely
manner.”
2001
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-01-261, Major
Management Problems and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration (2001), http:// www.gao.gov/pas/2001/d01261.pdf.
“This report addresses the major performance and accountability
challenges facing” SSA. This analysis hopes to help the
administration carry out its responsibility in a more efficient manner
by suggesting that it use its research and policy development
components to assist policymakers in addressing crucial policy
issues.
2002
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-02-322, Social
Security Disability: Disappointing Results from SSA's Effort to
Improve Disability Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention
(2002), http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d02322.pdf.
This report discusses five disability claims process initiatives,
four of which have been implemented by SSA, and the disappointing
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improvements they have achieved.
2003
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-03-117, Major
Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration (2003), http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03117.
In its analysis, the GAO recommends that modernizing the
federal disability programs should be added to the 2003 high-risk
list. The analysis implores that SSA continue “to strengthen the
integrity of the SSI program [,] . . . [i]mprove SSA's programs that
provide support for individuals with disabilities[,] . . . [b]etter
position SSA for future service delivery challenges[, and] . . .
[s]trengthen controls to protect the personal information SSA
develops and maintains.”
2004
GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce and the District of Columbia, Committee
on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-04-552-T,
Social Security Disability: Commissioner Proposes Strategy To
Improve the Claims Process, but Faces Implementation Challenges
(2004), http:// www.gao.gov/assets/120/110762.pdf.
This report finds that SSA is at a “crossroads” in its efforts to
improve its disability claims process and attempts to provide
guidance on how SSA can effectively move forward. In particular,
the report critically assesses the viability of the Commissioner's
strategy to overcome the agency's challenges.
GAO Report to the Chairman of the Social Security
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and
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Means
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-04-656, Social
Security Administration: More Effort Needed To Assess Consistency
of
Disability
Decisions
(2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04656.pdf.
The report addresses a problem that has plagued SSA:
inconsistency in its decisionmaking. The report examines “(1) the
status of SSA's process unification initiative, (2) SSA's assessments
of possible inconsistencies in decisions between adjudication levels,
and (3) whether SSA's new proposal incorporates changes to improve
consistency in decisions between adjudication levels.
2006
GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Social
Security, Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-06-779-T,
Social Security Administration: Agency Is Positioning Itself to
Implement Its New Disability Determination Process but Key Facets
are
Still
in
Development
(2006),
http://
www.gao.gov/assets/120/114067.pdf.
The SSA has designed and implemented a new disability
determination process that essentially eliminates the Appeals
Council. While there are concerns associated with this new initiative,
the report notes that SSA has made substantial preparation for the
successful implementation of its initiatives. The report takes into
account the various comments in reaching its assessment.
2007
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-40, Social
Security Disability: Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation
Could
Help
Address
Backlogs
(2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf.
The report makes recommendations to the SSA Commissioner to
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improve the execution of its initiatives. The report identifies trends
in Supplemental Security Income disability claims from 1997 to
2006. To identify the trends, the report reviews prior GAO reports,
position papers, testimonies from national advocacy groups, agency
documents, and interviews of SSA officials.
2008
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-08-1053, Social
Security Disability: Management Controls Needed to Strengthen
Demonstration
Projects
(2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081053.pdf.
This report recommends that “SSA establish written policies and
procedures for managing and operating its projects consistent with
standard research practices and internal control standards in the
federal government.”
2009
GAO Report to Congressional Committees
Citation: U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-09-398, Social
Security Disability: Additional Performance Measures and Better
Cost Estimates Could Help Improve SSA's Efforts to Eliminate Its
Hearings Backlog (2009).
In 2007, SSA implemented “a plan for eliminating the hearing
backlog.” In this report, “GAO (1) examined the Plan's potential to
eliminate the hearings-level backlog, (2) determined the extent to
which the plan included components of sound planning, and (3)
identified potential unintended effects of the Plan on hearings-level
operations and other aspects of the disability process.”

